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Providing Pensions for U.K. Employees with Varied
Working Lives
Deborah R. Cooper*

Abstract
Several different working lives are investigated, including employees with
breaks in employment, part-time employment, and temporary employment.
The pensions that could be provided to the different employees by final salary,
revalued career average, or money purchase pension schemes (plans) are calculated and compared. Some of the weaknesses in a final salary pension scheme
(the treatment of deferred pensioners and cross subsidies between different
groups of member) are considered. Possible alternative benefit structures are
considered to address the problems.
Key words and phrases: pension scheme, defined benefit, final salary, revalued
career average, money purchase
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Introduction

Most occupational pension schemes l in the U.K. are defined benefit final salary schemes (GAD, 1991). Such schemes aim to provide
a penSion at retirement based on years of service completed with the
sponsoring employer and salary received in the years immediately preceding retirement. Occupational pension schemes were introduced to
meet the different needs of employers and employees: employers want

*Deborah Cooper, Ph.D., F.LA., is a lecturer in actuarial science at the City University,
England. She joined the university after working for the Government Actuary's Department and for W.M. Mercer. Dr. Cooper has a B.Sc. in mathematics from the University of
London and a Ph.D. in mathematics (functional analysis) from the University of Wales.
She is a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries.
Dr. Cooper's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, City
University, Northampton Square, London, ECIV OHB, ENGLAND. Internet address:
D.R.Cooper@City.ac.uk
1 Pension

schemes are called pension plans in the U.S.
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a tax-efficient and paternalistic means of controlling their workforce,
and employees want a secure pension in retirement that bears some relation to the income they had received while working (Hannah, 1986). In
the past employees were expected to stay with one employer throughout most of their working lifetime. Consequently, pension schemes
were designed with retirement in mind, often giving no entitlement to
benefit on early withdrawal.

1.1

Early Withdrawal Benefits

The benefits occupational pension schemes provide for early withdrawals have improved considerably since pension schemes were introduced. In the private sector the change has arisen largely as a result
of legislation. In the U.K. early withdrawals (with more than two years'
qualifying service 2 ) now can expect a deferred pension increasing between the time of withdrawal and retirement at 5 percent per annum or
the rate of increase in the retail prices index over this period, whichever
is less. The value of the early withdrawal benefit, however, is still likely
to be less than the reserve that would normally be held for an equivalent
member remaining in the scheme. The difference between the value of
the withdrawal and staying benefits can reduce job mobility.
Because individuals who leave money purchase pension schemes
receive the full value of the reserve held (ignoring any surrender penalties), money purchase pension schemes are considered to be more portable. The withdrawal benefit now provided by final salary pension
schemes is a substantial improvement over what was available 20 years
ago;3 it is also better than what is available in many other countries
with occupational pension schemes (FEE, 1995). Final salary pension
schemes therefore have made a significant effort to rectify a major
weakness in their retirement benefit provisions; at the same time they
often have improved the level of other benefits that they offer.

1.2

Final Salary Pension Schemes

Many pension schemes are designed with the view of providing a
target benefit which usually is expressed in terms of an indiVidual's
annual salary immediately before retirement, i.e., final salary. Final
salary pension schemes frequently are criticized for the benefits they
2Qualifying service is service that contributes toward the pension that will be paid
from the scheme, which may include deferred benefits.
3Prior to 1978 members of occupational pension schemes had no statutory right to
a withdrawal benefit.
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provide to certain types of employees, in particular for the cross subsidies that exist between various categories of members. (For example,
see Disney, 1995.) Despite their apparent faults, however, they make an
increasingly important contribution to the income of pensioners (Johnson and Stears, 1995). It is necessary to understand the Significance of
the problems in their design and to discover whether it is possible to
amend them.
For those persons who do not have a substantial period of continuous service with one employer up to retirement, final salary pension
schemes may not provide the best option. For these persons money
purchase provision may offer better value for money. Value for money,
however, is a difficult concept to judge. For example, money purchase
pension schemes may offer employees a better rate of investment return than a defined benefit pension scheme (Disney, 1995), but they
also carry the possibility of a worse return.
In a defined benefit pension scheme the investment risk largely is
carried by the sponsoring employer. In a money purchase pension
scheme, however, the plan participant takes the risk. This makes money
purchase pension schemes more or less attractive according to the individual concerned's attitude toward risk. Similarly, there may be greater
flexibility within a money purchase pension scheme. For example, an
individual member of a money purchase pension scheme normally will
be able to choose which benefits the scheme should provide and to select a retirement age. Taking advantage of the fleXibility, however, is
likely to make the pension scheme more expensive.

1.3

Objectives

Because of the changing nature of employment [with much new employment being of the temporary or part-time variety (CSO, 1996)], it is
important to consider the impact of changing workplace dynamics on
the accumulation of pension benefits. This paper examines the pension
benefits provided by different types of U.K. pension schemes to persons
with different working lives and compares them with the benefits provided by a final salary pension scheme. Several categories of working
lifetimes are defined,4 and the retirement benefits accrued in the different pension schemes by each category are calculated and compared
under various scenarios. Though the arguments put forward in this
paper are based in the situation in the U.K., the problem of providing
4 Appendix

1 defines terms which may not transcend international boundaries.
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pensions for employees with different working histories is not unique
to the U.K., and the paper's conclusions can be applied more generally.
Final salary pension schemes are not risk free for all members. For
early withdrawals there is the risk that they may be unable to achieve
an adequate final salary pension because of the incomplete portability
offered by final salary pension schemes compared to money purchase
pension schemes. The paper attempts to quantify this risk.
A profound concern in performing this type of comparison is that
less than 50 percent of the workforce in the U.K. has occupational pension schemes available to them (GAD, 1991). The past 15 years in the
U.K. (and in many other industrialized countries) have seen a shift in
the nature of employment from permanent full-time jobs to part-time
and temporary work (CSO, 1992; Polivka, 1996). In the European Union
there are approximately 14 million part-time and 10 million temporary
workers. Table 1 shows the position of the U.K.
Those with part-time or temporary jobs are least likely to have access
to occupational pension schemes, even when such pension schemes are
provided by their employers (GAD, 1991; Hipple and Stewart, 1996).
Even when they are available, final salary pension schemes are considered to provide poor value for money. Those companies that offer
pension schemes to their full-time employees but exclude part-time or
temporary employees frequently use this argument, together with concerns about administrative costs, to justify exclusion.
Table 1
Temporary and Part-Time Workers.
In Great Britain (Excluding Northern Ireland)
As a Percentage of All Employees
Temporary Work Part-Time Work
6.0%
4.3%
7.8%
4.0%
Males
85.7%
Females 7.8%
8.0%
80.1%
32.9%
Total
6.0%
6.9%
26.3%
Source: Social Trends, Volrunes 17, 25, and 27.

State pension schemes have been ignored throughout the paper for
the sake of SimpliCity.
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2 Varied Working Lives
2.1

Definitions of Varied Working Lives

Defined benefit pension schemes have developed assuming that the
average employee will have a long period of full-time employment with
one employer until retirement. This type of employee is becoming less
common in today's workforce. Other patterns of employment are increasingly likely to be the norm.
We will consider examples of different working lifetimes and will
look at the benefits possible under different pension arrangements.
These examples will encompass persons employed part time; persons
who are made redundant and who mayor may not return to work; persons who take time from paid employment to look after children or
other dependents; persons who change jobs frequently; and persons
who change the hours they work. The six basic categories of working
lifetimes have been taken from Davies and Ward's pamphlet for the
Equal Opportunities Commission (Davies and Ward, 1992). They are:
• No Breaks (that is, in paid full-time employment throughout the
working life);
• Break and Part-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid
employment and then returning to part-time employment);
• Break and Full-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid
employment and then returning to full-time employment);
• Break and Mixed (that is, having time away from full-time paid
employment and, having returned to employment, experiencing a
mixture of part-time and full-time employment) ;
• Late Break (that is, taking a break from full-time employment relatively late in life) ;
• Late Start (that is, starting paid employment later than assumed
for the other classes of employee)
These categories were designed primarily to consider the working
patterns of women who took time away from paid employment to care
for children (for example, break and part-time) or elderly relatives (for
example, late break). With little adaptation they can be used to consider
the working lifetimes of employees (both male and female) who have

10
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been made redundant and not been able to find replacement employment or who have only been able to find short-term or temporary employment. To make the calculations more comprehensive and to deal
with these alternatives, some extra histories have been considered. The
considerations result in a total of eleven categories. For example, variations of late break are conSidered, where the break is either short or
long. Finally, a cyclical working pattern has been included to portray
the experience of many semi-skilled and low-skilled workers whose opportunities for employment tend to vary according to the economic
cycle.
Additional calculations have been performed for employees who
change jobs regularly throughout their working lifetimes, but are always assumed to be in employment. The labor markets in the U.K. and
the U.S. appear to be characterized by high turnover at young ages and
increasing tenure as employees age. Some figures are given in Tables
2 and 3. In the U.K. the average tenure has not changed significantly
over the past ten years (CSO, 1997); in the U.S. there is some debate
about whether average job tenures are falling (Farber, 1995; Swinnerton and Wial, 1995). It is estimated that the probability of an employee
in the U.S. remaining in paid employment for longer that four years is
approximately 50 percent (Swinnerton and Wial, 1995).
Table 2
Average Job Tenure in the U.K.
Males
Females

1986
9.4 years
6.5 years

1996
8.9 years
7.1 years

Table 3
Median Job Tenure in U.S.
Age
1993
25-34
3.2 years
35-44
5.8 years
45-54
9.5 years
55-64
12.4 years
Periods of job security increase with age, which is to the relative
advantage of a final salary scheme because the value of these schemes
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is weighted toward employment close to retirement age. In contrast, the
value of money purchase schemes is weighted toward employment at
younger ages. Full details of the assumptions made about the different
categories of employment are given in Appendix 2.

2.2

Measuring Benefits for Different Categories of Employment

A difficulty in dealing with diverse groups of persons is finding a
standard of comparison for the benefits provided by the different pension schemes that is appropriate for all concerned. There are several
possible choices of benchmark, each one with certain advantages and
disadvantages. Two used in this paper are described below.

2.2.1

Total Service Pension

One measure to use as a benchmark is the pension that could be
provided from a final salary pension scheme, had all of the employee's
service been completed in consecutive years, in a pension scheme that
does not distinguish part-time and full-time service. This is called the
total service penSion.
The total service pension is, arguably, the best pension a final salary
pension scheme can be expected to provide: it ignores breaks in service
as well as changes in type of employment. It does not compensate parttime employees and those taking breaks from employment for the lower
rates of salary growth assumed (see Section 4.3.3) and the shorter time
spent in paid employment; as expected, these employees do not have a
direct opportunity to recoup the earnings they have lost.

2.2.2

Final Salary

For final salary pension schemes, there is a choice of which final
salary to use. s If we choose the final basic salary of the individual
concerned, it becomes difficult to make comparisons across the board.
There is also an additional problem: for some groups final salary may
have been earned several years prior to retirement, while for others it
may not be an annual rate. On the other hand, if a comparison is made
sCommon definitions of final salary in the U.K. include basic salary earned in the 12
months preceding retirement; the average annual rate of basic salary earned in the 36
months preceding retirement; and the annual rate of salary at retirement, including the
average of 'fluctuating emoluments' over the preceding 36 months (GAD, 1991)
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with the employee's last earnings before retirement, we can get some
idea how well different pension schemes provide replacement income
for its members.
The results under final salary are influenced heavily by the total
amount of service; that is, the longer the employee has worked, the
better the pension scheme appears. With few exceptions the "full-time
and bonus" category of employee appears to do best using final salary
as a measure of performance, and the "break and mixed" category employees appear to do worst.
Other measures that do not depend on a particular working history demonstrate the force of two commonplace observations: first, the
longer the period over which the employee contributes to a money purchase pension scheme, the larger the expected benefit; second, making
provision in money purchase pension schemes early in the employee's
working lifetime is important. These observations both provide arguments in favor of a state pension, such as the basic state penSion in the
U.K., which underpinS other layers of benefit. 6

3 The Different Pension Schemes
The different pension schemes considered are deliberately simple.
For occupational pension schemes to succeed they must be attractive
to both employers and employees. A penSion scheme with a relatively
simple benefit design will be straightforward to manage and easy to
understand and so will be desired by both groups.
3.1

Final Salary Pension Scheme

The final salary penSion scheme used provides a pension of 1/60th
of final salary for each year of service completed. This is the most common accrual rate among contracted oue pension schemes in the U.K.
private sector (GAD, 1991); public sector schemes, which provide an accrual rate of 1/80th, provide a lump sum in addition to the pension. For
those employees working part time, the pension scheme provides a pension based on the annual rate of salary, with total service aggregated.
Someone retiring with a total of n years of service, with an average of
hi (hi:::; 40) hours per week during year i (i = 1,2, ... , n), where 40
6 A comparison with

the basic state pension is given in Appendix 3.
7That is, contracted out of the state earnings related pension scheme (Appendix 1).
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hours is considered full time, would receive an annual pension of:
S n h·

Annual Pension = 60

I

_t

i=140

where S is the annualized rate of salary received in the 12 months preceding retirement. Thus, someone retiring with a total of 30 years at
20 hours per week part time would receive an annual pension of:
.
S
20 S
Annual PenSIOn = - x 30 x - = 60
40 4·

Those pension scheme members who work different part-time hours at
different points in their career will have the appropriate proportion of
each year of service used in the calculation.
A further consideration is how members of pension schemes are
treated when they move from one category of employment to another.
For example, if an employee moves from full-time to part-time status,
some penSion schemes make the full-time entitlement paid-up 8 and
start accrual in the pension scheme afresh as a part-time employee.
This may be the case if a separate pension scheme is operated for parttime employees. Other pension schemes may consider the two periods continuous service. Where relevant, results are presented on both
bases.
Finally, we consider the position of pension schemes that allow employees to take extended breaks and return to service, counting the
periods of employment at either side of the break as one consecutive
period for accrual purposes. Several pension schemes, particularly in
the public sector, allow past members who rejoin the pension scheme
after a break from employment to have service counted as continuous
on payment of a small contribution, usually related to pay at previous
withdrawal. In effect, this is the total service penSion.

3.2

Revalued Career Average Pension Scheme

The revalued career average pension scheme provides a pension of
1/60th of the revalued career average salary for each year of service.
Calculations have been made assuming a rate of revaluation in line with
price inflation as well as one in line with growth in earnings. The former
rate of revaluation will make the pension scheme perform less well
8That is, the accrued pension is frozen, receiving only statutory revaluation rather
than increasing in line with salaries.

14

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 5, No.1, 1997

than a final salary pension scheme for a full-time employee. Also, if
revaluation is in line with increases in salaries, then, the final salary
pension scheme and the revalued career average pension schemes are
identical for full-time employees.
In this revalued career average pension scheme there is no difficulty
with the treatment of early withdrawals, because the same rate of revaluation is applied to deferred benefits. The different categories of members do not have to be considered separately. The state earnings-related
pension scheme operates in this way.
The pension for part-time employees is calculated Similarly to the
final salary pension scheme.
3.3

Money Purchase Pension Scheme

Two money purchase pension schemes are included in the analysis:
• Employees contribute 5 percent of their salaries throughout their
working lifetimes .
• When employees are in full-time paid employment they contribute
the maximum amount to the pension scheme, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be 17.5 percent of salary at all ages. For parttime employees, however, they contribute only 5 percent of salary
at all ages.
The first arrangement was selected because, on average, the contribution to occupational pension schemes made by members is about 5
percent of their salaries (GAD, 1991). Few employers have chosen to
make contributions to the private money purchase pension schemes
(or personal pension plans) of their employees. Consequently, it seems
reasonable to calculate the amount of pension that could be provided
with the contributions saved by opting out of an occupational pension
scheme. For simplicity the calculations do not allow explicitly for expenses. Implicit allowances are made instead.
There are several reasons for the two tiers of contribution in the
second plan. First, those with low pay have less opportunity to save, so
it seems unreasonable to suppose those employees would continue to
invest the same proportion of their salaries in a penSion scheme if they
moved from full-time to part-time employment (Table 4). Second, if an
employer were to contribute to a money purchase pension scheme, it
seems most likely that they would do so only for full-time employees. 9
9That a low level of contribution will lead to a low level of benefit is not a failure of
money purchase schemes. The problems of money purchase schemes that this paper
considers are those of volatility and high cost.
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Finally, most individual money purchase pension schemes have a fixed
charge deducted from each contribution, so the value to the plan participant of the contribution made reduces with the amount. Thus, the
lower tier acts partly as an implicit allowance for per policy fees.
Table 4
Distribution of U.K. Annual Household Expenditure
On Personal Pensions by Gross Income
Quintiles
5th
4th
3rd
2nd
1st (Top)
Lowest Bound
£117 £223
£367
£556
Avg Wkly Exp £0.25 £0.84 £2.68 £4.54
£14.92
Source: Family Spending, (50,1995; Avg Wkly Exp

=

Average Weekly Expenditure.

In addition we consider what level of contribution would be required
by a money purchase scheme (given the assumptions made) in order to
reproduce the retirement benefit provided by the final salary scheme.

4

Assumptions

The calculations have been performed for an employee starting employment on £16,000. This is close to the average wage for male employees in 1995. In most cases the absolute figure does not matter, as
the comparison is done using proportions and percentages. In addition, it is assumed that the basic state pension will continue to increase
in line with the Retail Prices Index, as it has since 1979. Other assumptions are specified below.

4.1

Service

The calculations assume a full working lifetime consists of 40 hours
paid employment per week from age 20 to 60; the maximum pension in
the final salary pension scheme is 2/3rds of salary. Pension payments
to retirees start at the normal pensionable age, which is age 60. It could
be argued that 65 is a more realistic retirement age because most pension schemes have a normal pension age of 65 for men, and the trend
seems to be to equalize pension ages for men and women at age 65
(GAD, 1991). The average age at which pension payments commence,

16
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as reported in the Government Actuary's Survey, is about age 61, however. Employees often take early retirement, whether voluntarily or not.
An older normal retirement age would enhance the apparent performance of money purchase pension schemes because of the effect of
compound interest and mortality. The calculations assume that employees start contributing to money purchase pension schemes at age
20, however, and the early commencement age partially offsets the effect of the early retirement age, so this apparent unfairness has largely
been ignored.
Part-time employees have been included at two levels of service.
Over 5 million persons work part time in the U.K., of whom about 80
percent are women. Significant proportions of male part-time employees are those already in retirement from their main occupation (GAD,
1991), and it is difficult to make allowance for this group. Until women
have children, those in employment are largely in full-time work (Martin and Roberts, 1984). Of these, 50 percent return to work within
nine months of having a baby; about 30 percent return to full-time employment (McRae and Daniel, 1991). Many of the remainder return to
part-time work once their children are in school. We can assume that,
to some extent, women choose to work part-time because of child care
responsibilities.
Part-time employees are assumed to work for either 40 percent (that
is, 16 hours) or 75 percent (that is, 30 hours) of a full working week. In
addition, the service histories of some part-time employees used in the
analysis assume that women are able to choose to work longer hours
as their children grow older. There is some evidence to support this
pattern (EOCNI, 1993). For example, the "break-and-mixed" category
assumes the employee starts by working full-time; stops paid employment to care for young children; returns to paid part-time employment
of 16 hours per week; has a further break; and then works until retirement at 30 hours per week.

4.2

Mortality

Except in the calculation of the annuity used for converting the
money purchase fund into a penSion, mortality is ignored throughout
the analysis. This has different implications for the defined benefit pension schemes and for the money purchase pension scheme, although
the effect on death benefits is the same. By ignoring mortality the analysis assumes that the death benefits provided are equal in value to the
reserve or actuarial liability.

Cooper: Providing Pensions for Employees
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Money Purchase Pension Scheme

By ignoring mortality when accumulating the contributions paid to
the money purchase pension scheme the analysis assumes that, on
death before retirement, the value of the fund is applied to purchase
benefits for any dependent survivor or is paid to the estate of the plan
participant.
We assume that the full accumulated fund is used to purchase retirement pension. Death benefits in addition to those provided by the
accumulated fund must be purchased with additional contributions. In
general this means that unless an additional contribution is paid, the
provision for dependents on early death will be inadequate.

4.2.2

Defined Benefit Pension Schemes

The average defined benefit pension scheme provides a lump sum
death benefit of nearly three times pensionable salary together with a
spouse's pension calculated allowing for some enhancement of service
(GAD, 1991). In the private sector this is usually up to full potential
service. Except for older employees, the value of these benefits is likely
to be greater than the reserve required to fund the retirement benefit.
Ignoring mortality can result in an underestimate of the cost of a
money purchase pension scheme and of the value of the benefits from
a defined benefit pension scheme. Rather than adjust the calculations
to allow for this difference between the two types of pension scheme,
we will discuss it in the results section.
The other decrements affecting pension schemes are withdrawal and
ill health retirement. These are considered in later sections of this paper.

4.3

Economic Assumptions

Interest rate assumptions are needed to project the accumulated
value of the money purchase fund; as a yardstick to measure salary
growth and inflation; and to cost the annuity at retirement. These rates
are difficult to predict, and the results are sensitive to the assumptions
chosen. For this reason, a sensitivity analysis is included as part of
the results. The interest rates are assumed to be constant over time
as the comparison of results is made only at the end of one period of
time. The rates reflect an average of the experience over the period of a
person's working lifetime. Each assumption is briefly discussed below.

18
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Inflation

The inflation assumption is used to increase benefits while in deferment and as a basis from which to estimate real rates of salary growth
and real interest rates.
It is assumed that the Retail Prices Index will increase 4 percent per
annum. This is slightly higher than the current U.K. government's selfimposed maximum inflation target, but lower than the average over the
past 20 years.
If inflation is higher than that assumed in the projection, then nominal investment return will improve if the real rate of investment return remains the same. Similarly, if real rates of salary growth remain
the same, salaries paid will be higher. Thus, money purchase pension
schemes will perform relatively better than otherwise, having higher
income from investments and contributions; defined benefit pension
schemes will award pensions based on a higher salary figure. The benefit design of the pension schemes will determine which arrangement
gives the better value for money.

4.3.2

Real Interest Rates

The assumption for real interest rates is combined with the inflation assumption to accumulate the contributions made to the money
purchase fund. A real rate of return of 4 percent per annum has been
assumed. This rate reflects what is currently available on longer term
index-linked gilts lO (roughly 3.5 percent on gilts maturing in 2030, as
of March 1996) which gives a conservative estimate of the likely investment performance of a fund (Thornton and Wilson, 1992). This approach can be justified for two reasons: first, the rate used is assumed
to be net of expenses (to allow implicitly for expenses), and second,
most persons included in the categories of employees in this survey
will be on fairly low and insecure incomes and probably would want a
personal pension plan giving a reasonably secure investment return.
In the U.K. it seems that a small majority of investors in personal
pension plans prefer more cautious, with profit, poliCies to unit-linked
policies (ABI, 1996). Some figures are given in Table 5. Some of the
linked poliCies are linked to with-profit or fixed interest unitized funds.
Low interest rates penalize the money purchase pension scheme
both by depressing the assumed performance of the pension scheme
and by making the annuity more expensive. In order to explore a plau10 Gilts

is the name given to securities issued by the United Kingdom government.
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Table 5
Personal Pensions: New Business
(In £1,OOO,OOOs)
1991 1993
Number of New Policies
2595 2030
Net Premium Income:
Single Premium-Linked
1719 2393
Single Premium-Non-Linked 2254 2626
Yearly Premium-Linked
600
580
Yearly Premium-Non-Linked 519
517
DSS* Rebate-Linked
369
207
DSS* Rebate-Non-Linked
226
139
Total
5688 6462
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1995
1199
1675
1628
536
411
92
53
4395

*The DSS rebate is the contribution paid by the Department of Social
Security to appropriate personal pension schemes (Appendix 1).

sible range of results, calculations also have been performed assuming
real interest rates of 5 percent.

4.3.3

Real Salary Growth

The assumption for real salary growth also can be considered to be
low: a real rate of salary growth of 1 percent per annum has been assumed. While average salaries increased faster than this over the 1980s,
there is no certainty that they will continue to do so. At present, only
senior executive salaries are increasing faster than the rate of inflation,
and these employees are unlikely to have part-time contracts. Calculations also are performed assuming 2 percent real growth. This is to be
consistent with the 5 percent real growth tested above, as a 4 percent
gap between real interest rates and real salary growth may be too large.
The analysis assumes that salaries only increase faster than inflation
when an employee is in full-time work. At ages when a working profile imposes part-time work, salaries are increased in line with inflation
only. Similarly, after a period of unemployment, the salary at which the
employee is assumed to reenter employment will be the salary at the
previous date of exit increased in line with inflation only. There is evidence to support these assumptions, as well as the belief that part-time
employees are usually paid less than the equivalent full-time employees. This can be shown by comparing hourly rates and by considering
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measures of productivity (Kremer and Montgomery, 1993). No attempt
has been made to allow for different relative levels of pay in the analysis.
A consequence of the assumption that real salary growth only occurs
during periods of full-time employment is that those taking breaks from
employment will return to work at a relatively lower level of pay than
their contemporaries who remained in full-time work.
lust as assuming large real investment returns will result in a better
performance for money purchase pension schemes, larger real salary
growth will mean defined benefit pension schemes pay a larger pension. In the case of high real investment returns, however, the apparent advantage accrues only to the money purchase pension scheme. In
the case of high salary growth, there is an advantage to both types
of pension schemes: the money purchase pension scheme benefits
from larger contributions. In practice, if investment returns are better
than expected over the long term, members of defined benefit pension
schemes can expect to receive some advantage. In the past, surplus in
occupational pension schemes has been used to make (discretionary)
increases to pensions in payment and, less frequently, other benefit
improvements.

4.3.4 The Annuity
An interest rate consistent with the inflation and real interest rate
assumptions above has been used to calculate the annuity.
The comparison between the money purchase and defined benefit
pension schemes has been made assuming that a pension increasing
at 4 percent per annum is purchased (that is, in line with limited price
increases, given the inflation assumption). According to the Government Actuary's survey (GAD, 1991), occupational pension schemes in
the private sector guarantee, on average, increases of about 2 percent
per annum. In 1986 they granted increases of 3.5 percent per annum,
on average. Public sector penSion schemes guarantee increases in line
with inflation. Although limited price increases are only a statutory requirement on pensions accrued after April 1997, it seems reasonable
to include the cost of increases to make the comparisons consistent.
Allowing for increases to pensions in payment will make money purchase pension schemes appear to perform less well than defined pension schemes.
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5 The Results
We begin by considering how well final salary pension schemes perform compared to the total service pension, and by presenting the estimated additional cost required to fund the difference between the
final salary pension and the total service pension for each category of
member. The benefits provided by a revalued career average pension
scheme also are considered. The pensions provided by money purchase
pension schemes are compared with the total service pension, and the
vulnerability of the plan participant to worse than expected investment
and salary experience is investigated.
A comparison of benefits with the basic state pension and with average earnings is presented in Appendix 3 to reinforce some of the
results.

5.1

Final Salary Defined Benefit Pension Scheme

Final salary pension schemes are considered to fall short of members' expectations on two counts: (i) because of their treatment of early
withdrawals, and (ii) because of cross subsidies between members. We
shall first consider early withdrawals.

5.1.1

Deferred Pensioner

The benefit paid to early withdrawals usually has a smaller value
than the reserve required for employees who remain with an employer.
Deferred benefits normally are increased at rates less than the rate of
increase in earnings. The results presented in Table 6 show, however,
that (given the set of assumptions used for the calculations) the differences are not exceptional. The calculation of the total service pension
effectively assumes that all service is completed contiguously and in
the years immediately preceding retirement. This is used as a proxy
for a final salary pension scheme that increases deferred pensions in
line with earnings. Table A4 in Appendix 2 gives the amount of the
total service pension accrued by each category of employee relative to
the full-time pension.
We can assess how poorly deferred employees do under the present
arrangements by comparing the total service pension with the pension
calculated assuming movements between part-time and full-time service do not interrupt pension accrual (called "part/full time continuous"). The difference in the two pensions arises because of the differ-
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ence between inflation and salary growth. We have calculations assuming a 1 percent and 2 percent real salary growth.
Table 6
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension
Real Salary Growth
1% Growth 2% Growth
Full-Time
100.0%
100.0%
Break and Mixed
97.3%
94.7%
Late Break
92.5%
86.0%
Break and Part-Time
99.6%
99.2%
Early Break and Full-Time
96.3%
93.5%
Late Break and Full-Time
94.0%
89.1%
Short Break and Full-Time
93.7%
88.8%
Long Break and Full-Time
94.4%
89.7%
94.0%
89.1%
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
100.0%
100.0%
Cyclical
93.0%
86.7%

As expected, deferred pensioners do less well when the annual real
salary growth rate is large. In addition, they would do less well under
current legislation if inflation were high over the deferred period, as
the statutory increase in deferment is capped at 5 percent per annum.
Categories (other than the "full-time" and "full-time & bonus" categories) that appear to do relatively well under the present arrangements
are those with the smallest proportion of full-time employment. Their
earnings do not attract real salary increases; therefore, the difference
between deferred benefits and ongoing benefits does not significantly
reduce their expectations.
Table 7 gives the additional contributions (paid over a working lifetime) required as a percentage of annual salary to make up the shortfall
in pension identified in Table 6.
We also can consider the position of employees who are in full-time
paid employment throughout their career, but who change jobs frequently. Some employees choose to change jobs frequently, but employees increasingly are being offered temporary contracts-these employees have no choice about their job mobility. Between 1994 and
1995 the number of employees with temporary contracts increased 10
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Table 7
Additional Contribution Required
To Fund the Total Service Pension
*4/1 5/1
4/2
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Full-Time
0.2% 0.1% 0.4%
Break and Mixed
0.6% 0.4% 1.2%
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Early Break and Full-Time 0.4% 0.3% 0.8%
Late Break and Full-Time
0.6% 0.4% 1.2%
Short Break and Full-Time 0.6% 0.4% 1.3%
Long Break and Full-Time 0.5% 0.4% 1.0%
0.6% 0.5% 1.3%
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.5% 0.4% 1.1%
Cyclical
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5/2
0.0%
0.3%
0.9%
0.0%
0.6%
0.9%
1.0%
0.8%
1.0%
0.0%
0.8%

*4/1, for example, refers to 4 percent real investment growth and
1 percent real salary growth.

percent to 1.5 million. The majority of persons in these jobs would have
chosen permanent employment had it been available (CSO, 1996). With
each withdrawal, the contribution to pension made by a period of service is effectively downgraded in a typical final salary pension scheme.
The results for employees who change jobs frequently are presented
in Table 8, and the extra contribution required to meet the shortfall is
shown in Table 9.
Table 8
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension
Real Salary Growth
1% Growth 2% Growth
84.6%
Withdraw Every Five Years
72.5%
86.7%
76.1%
Withdraw Every Ten Years
96.3%
93.8%
Withdraw After Five Years Only

Tables 8 and 9 show that those employees who change paid employment frequently are disadvantaged in a final salary pension scheme if
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Table 9
Additional Contribution Required
To Fund the Total Service Pension
Withdraw Every Five Years
Withdraw Every Ten Years
Withdraw After Five Years Only

4/1
1.5%
1.3%
0.3%

5/1
1.1%
0.9%
0.3%

4/2
3.2%
2.8%
0.7%

5/2
2.4%
2.1%
0.6%

deferred pensions are increased in line with inflation only. The impact
of real salary increases has a more significant effect than the frequency
of job change, however, as shown in Table 10.
In certain circumstances, it is possible to redress the balance between early withdrawals and those who remain with an employer. For
an employer, the motivation to do so could depend on the reason for
leaving employment. Employees leave their jobs for several reasons,
e.g.:
• They choose to go to another employer;
• They are made redundant or their contract ends;
• They need time away from employment, for example, for child
care and would like longer than their statutory allowance.
Those employers who give employees the right to an extended break
without jeopardizing their future employment may have addressed the
grounds for complaint of one of the above groups. For example, the employee will be able to count the two periods of service as though they
were continuous for the calculation of benefit and frequently will be
allowed, for a nominal contribution, to have the break included as part
of their pensionable service. Employees seem to support this arrangement, even when they are unlikely to profit directly from it (Gough,
1997).

Similarly, those employees who are made redundant are already entitled to lump sum payments, as established in employment law. Part of
the redundancy payment could be directed toward a pension scheme.
In addition, if it can be agreed that at least part of the employer's contribution to an occupational pension scheme is in respect of deferred
pay, the redundancy payment could be increased to allow for this, and
that part of the lump sum could be compulsorily invested in a pension
arrangement.
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Table 10
Portion of Total Service Pensions Earned By
An Employee Who Regularly Changes Employment
Real Salary Length of Consecutive Employments (in Years)
Growth
1
2
5
10
20
1%
82.9% 83.0% 84.6% 86.7%
91.0%
2%
69.8% 70.4% 72.5% 76.1%
83.6%

The level of replacement income provided by the different pension
schemes for some categories of employee is shown in Table 11. The results suggest that if an employee in a final salary pension scheme must
take a break from paid employment, it should be taken early rather than
late. The deferred pension will then be in respect of a shorter period
of service. This differs from the position of an employee in a money
purchase pension scheme, where it is better to take a late break. With
the assumption of 1 percent real salary growth, the employee taking
an early break loses about 2 percent of the value of the total service
pension, and the employee taking a late break loses 3 percent. If there
is 2 percent real salary growth, the loss is in the order of 3 percent and
6 percent, respectively. The length of the break in employment also
affects the level of replacement income available from a final salary
pension scheme, although not substantially. The total service pension
is the same percentage of final salary, regardless of the assumption for
salary growth.
Table 11
Pensions as a Percentage of Final Salary
With Deferred Pension
2% Real
1% Real
Total Service
Salary
Growth
Salary
Growth
Pensions
46.7%
48.2%
50.0%
Early Break
44.5%
50.0%
47.0%
Late Break
54.7%
51.8%
Short Break
58.3%
Long Break
41.7%
39.4%
37.4%
Now we turn to the other cross subsidies. Cross subsidies exist
in any insurance arrangement, such as a defined benefit retirement
pension scheme. An obvious subsidy is from those who die just be-
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fore reaching retirement to those who survive well beyond pension age.
Other subsidies include:
• From employees with no dependents to those with dependents;
• From those who do not have much salary growth, particularly toward the end of their career, to those whose salary grows faster
than the average, particularly close to retirement (Wilkie, 1985).
The former problem is discussed in Section 6. The latter issue can
be considered by looking at the results for the "full-time-and-bonus"
employee.
This paper does not attempt to address the issue of cross subsidies.
We just consider the extent of their presence in the different schemes
under consideration.

5.1.2

Salary Growth

If we consider "full-time-and-bonus" employees, we can investigate
the different benefits available to employees whose salary falls when
approaching retirement. It is assumed that this category of employee
receives a 20 percent bonus on salary up to age 45 due, for example,
to overtime payments. Thereafter, the bonus stops and the employee
receives basic salary only. Consequently, the employee's pension will
be calculated using the same final salary as other full-time employees,
including those who have no history of overtime. The calculation of
the final salary pension ignores the bonus earned when the employee
was younger. Because of this problem with the formula, many final
salary pension schemes ignore so-called fluctuating emoluments (compensation) in the calculation of pensionable salaryll (GAD, 1991). The
employee is able to make other pension provisions, such as additional
voluntary contributions. If defined benefit pensions are intended to
maintain the level of income just before retirement, this arrangement
seems reasonable. A sizable proportion of pension schemes include
all pay in the calculation of pensionable salary, however, so it is worth
considering the alternatives. The results for the "full-time-and-bonus"
category are given in Table 12.
The relative values of the benefits depend heavily on the rate of
revaluation assumed to be applied in the revalued career average pension scheme. Even though the employee was assumed to earn 120 percent of the basic salary for 25 years, revaluation in line with inflation is
llThe salary included in the calculation of pension.
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Table 12
Revalued Career Average Pension Received by Full-Time
And Bonus Employees as a Proportion of Final Salary
Revalued in Line With:
Inflation
Salaries
1% Real Salary Growth
61.8%
75.0%
51.4%
75.0%
2% Real Salary Growth
Note: Total Service Pension is 66.7% of final salary.

unable to match the benefit from the final salary pension scheme. The
position is improved, however, when the pension scheme revalues pensionable salaries in line with salary growth. The employee effectively
earns 12.5 percent more pay over a working lifetime than an employee
who receives no bonus, and this is reflected in the pension.
Thus, employees with fluctuating emoluments that decrease in size
toward retirement may receive a higher pension from a revalued career
average pension scheme. It follows that a final salary pension scheme
that includes such employees, and incorporates their total pay in the
definition of pensionable salary, will incorporate some cross subsidy
from these employees to those without fluctuating emoluments. Using
similar arguments, it also follows that there is a cross subsidy from
those with lower salary growth than the average to those with higher
salary growth.
We shall now consider the revalued career average pensions of the
other categories of employee.
5.2

Revalued Career Average Pension Schemes

The employees who do relatively well in a revalued career average
pension scheme, even when the revaluation is only in line with price
inflation, are those who work part time. Because it is assumed that the
salaries of part-time employees do not increase any faster than price
inflation, this should not be surprising. Even so, the pension scheme is
unable to provide a pension as large as the final salary pension scheme.
If the rate of revaluation is increased to be in line with salary growth, the
position alters. All categories of employee do at least as well (full-time)
or better (all other categories) in the revalued career average pension
scheme as they would do in a final salary pension scheme. These results
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are shown in Table 13, assuming 1 percent real salary growth, and they
should be compared with those in Table 6.
The revalued career average pension, with revaluation in line with
earnings, restores the link to actual years worked that is partly lost in
the final salary scheme for those employees with breaks in their working
history. As a result, we see that a revalued career average pension
scheme can be used to remove the cross subsidy between stayers and
withdrawals, as well as between low and high earners. The pension
design depends not only on service, but also on how significant a year
of service is in terms of income to the employee.
Table 13
Revalued Career Average Pension
As Percentage of Total Service Pension
Revalued in Line With:
Inflation
Salaries
Full-Time
82.9%
100.0%
94.1%
118.2%
Break and Mixed
Late Break
89.0%
111.6%
Break and Part-Time
97.9%
119.9%
Early Break and Full-Time
86.9%
101.7%
86.9%
103.5%
Late Break and Full-Time
Short Break and Full-Time
84.9%
101.5%
89.0%
106.4%
Long Break and Full-Time
86.9%
101.7%
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
92.5%
112.5%
91.3%
113.4%
Cyclical
There are difficulties in adopting a sensible and fair level of revaluation. The data in Table 12 show the relative penalties to one category of
employee where revaluation is in line with inflation and salaries grow
faster than inflation. In addition, if a pension is viewed as deferred
compensation, then its value should reflect real levels of salaries when
it vests, otherwise part of the salary in each year of work prior to retirement has been devalued. Because a single, average rate of revaluation
must be applied to all members in a pension scheme, those employees
whose salaries increase faster than the average may feel that they are
subsidizing those with flatter salary progression. If the annual rate of
revaluation is appropriate for the industry in which the company oper-
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ates or even linked to actual rates of salary growth within the company,
the effect of the revaluation will be to maintain the real value of a year
of work. The extent of the cross subsidy will be reduced significantly.

5.3

Money Purchase Pension Schemes

The calculations show that, if the pension purchased under a money
purchase scheme is compared with the total service penSion, those
employees who have breaks in their employment appear to do better
than the standard "full-time" employee from money purchase pension
schemes (Table 14). For example, assuming a contribution of 5 percent salary to a money purchase pension scheme and 5 percent real
investment growth and 2 percent real salary growth, the "break-andpart-time" employee receives 89.4 percent of the total service pension,
whereas the "full-time" employee receives a pension of only 56.3 percent. The employees' career profiles assume they all begin their paid
employment with a period of full-time service, and the effect of these
early contributions is most significant: "break-and-part-time" employees do best because the largest proportion of their contribution is made
in the early years.
When replacement income is conSidered, the position is reversed;
full-time employees appear to do better. This apparent contradiction
arises because the total service pension is based on the proportion of
time worked, whereas the comparison for replacement income is based
on final annualized salary. That is, it will be relatively larger than the
total service pension for those whose paid employment included parttime work.
The contributions required throughout a working lifetime, as a constant proportion of salary, to reproduce the total service pension in
retirement (given the assumptions of the paper) are presented in Table
14. The pension being funded by each category of employee is the same
amount in the columns 4/1 and 5/1 and a higher amount in columns 4/2
and 5/2. The different assumptions for real salary growth do not have
a significant effect on the contribution required from those employees
with part-time service, as they only experience real salary growth for
a small proportion of their careers. There is a notable difference for
those employees working full time.
We can use Table 14 to form an idea of how vulnerable money purchase pension schemes are to changes in experience. For example, if a
full-time employee chose to contribute 8.9 percent of salary to a pension scheme (assuming 5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary
growth) and the experience of the pension scheme turned out to aver-
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Table 14
Contributions to a Money Purchase Pension Scheme
Required to Fund a Total Service Pension
Full-Time
Break and Mixed
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
Early Break and Full-Time
Late Break and Full-Time
Short Break and Full-Time
Long Break and Full-Time
Late Start
Full-Time & Bonus
Cyclical

4/1
9.4%
7.0%
7.6%
7.4%
10.0%
9.2%
7.4%
8.7%
10.1%
8.2%
7.6%

5/1
7.0%
5.1%
5.5%
5.4%
7.6%
6.9%
7.1%
6.4%
7.8%
6.1%
5.6%

4/2
11.7%
7.6%
8.7%
7.6%
11.8%
11.0%
11.5%
10.1%
12.0%
10.3%
8.5%

5/2
8.9%
5.5%
6.4%
5.6%
9.1%
8.3%
8.7%
7.5%
9.3%
7.7%
6.2%

age 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth, the retirement pension provided by the pension scheme would be 5.5 percent
less than expected. The "break-and-part-time" employee contributing
5.6 percent would be 24.3 percent lower. These calculations are summarized in Table 15.
The data in Table 15 give an indication of the downside risk of using
money purchase arrangement to provide for retirement income. In the
U.K. for money purchase pension schemes operated by an employer,
there is an obligation for an actuary to recommend a level of contribution for a given target benefit. For individual money purchase pension
schemes (personal pension plans) a salesperson normally would provide estimates of the projected level of benefit, given certain levels of
contribution. The bases that can be used for the projection are prescribed. Currently the mid-range basis would permit 9 percent interest
and 3 percent inflation, which is not too dissimilar from the 5/2 assumption (it is more optimistic).
If the money purchase pension scheme earns interest at 8 percent
per annum rather than 9 percent, then its value, accumulated to retirement, will be less than estimated at the start. Similarly, if the employee
experiences real salary growth of 1 percent per annum rather than 2
percent, then the fund will receive less income from contributions and
will be smaller than originally estimated. Thus, the penSion it provides
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will be smaller. In addition, if interest rates at retirement are lower than
anticipated, the cost of the retirement annuity will be more expensive,
reducing the pension even further. In a money purchase scheme all
these risks are borne by the individual plan participant.
Table 15
Effect of Wrong Contribution Level
Percentage of
Total Service Pension *
Full-Time
94.5%
Break and Mixed
77.5%
84.0%
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
75.8%
Early Break and Full-Time
91.5%
89.7%
Late Break and Full-Time
Short Break and Full-Time
92.5%
Long Break and Full-Time
86.1%
92.1%
Late Start
94.6%
Full-Time & Bonus
Cyclical
82.0%

*Assumes that the contribution required to fund the total service pension, given
5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary growth is paid and that actual
experience is 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth.
Those persons we are assuming are least able to accept the uncertainty of a money purchase pension scheme (for example, those with
some part-time employment) are the most vulnerable.
From Table 14 it should be apparent that if employees contribute
the maximum 17.5 percent of salary assumed under the money purchase and variable arrangement, in all cases the pension provided will
exceed the total service pension. The comparison for employees with
full-time paid employment only is straightforward. Those employees
with periods of part-time employment contribute at different rates depending on their status, making the comparison more difficult. Because the two categories concerned both begin paid work in full-time
employment, the importance of their early contributions together with
their depressed final salary (due to inflation only increases) makes the
money purchase pension scheme perform slightly better than the contributions paid would suggest.
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5.4

Case Study

We have seen that the employees who appear to do least well in
a final salary pension scheme are those who change jobs frequently.
The employee who changes jobs regularly, but is always in full-time
employment, and the cyclical category of employee both receive pensions of less than 85 percent of their respective total service pensions
from the final salary scheme. Consequently, we consider the pension
entitlements of these employees in more detail.
Assume an employee wishes to receive a pension equal to the total
service pension. This is equivalent to the revalued career average pension the employee would receive, if revaluation were in line with salary
growth. Because the revalued career average pension scheme meets the
aim, we only need consider money purchase and final salary pension
schemes.
There are various possibilities for the employee. For example, the
employee could:
• Join an occupational pension scheme and pay additional voluntary
contributions;
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equivalent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme;
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the contribution believed necessary to fund 100 percent of the total service
pension; or
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equivalent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme, with
the employer contributing the remainder.
Table 16 shows the contributions required by these employees to
fund a total service pension. If the employee joins a final salary pension scheme, then additional voluntary contributions are necessary to
increase the scheme's pension to the total service pension. These are
given in the first row of figures for each category. Otherwise the employee must join a money purchase pension scheme and fund the total
service pension himself or herself, perhaps in conjunction with an employer. The contribution required for this is given in the second row of
figures.
We should consider the employee's financial position while in employment, depending on the decision made. Assume members contribute 5 percent of their pay to the occupational pension scheme. Then
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Table 16
Contribution to Money Purchase Pension Scheme
Or Additional Contributions Required for Equivalent Pension
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
Change Jobs
Every 5 Years
Final Salary Scheme
1.5% 1.1% 3.2%
2.4%
Money Purchase Scheme 9.4% 7.0% 11.7%
8.9%
Cyclical
Final Salary Scheme
0.5% 0.4% 1.1%
0.8%
Money Purchase Scheme 7.6% 5.6% 8.5%
6.2%
Source: Tables 9 and 14.

the employee's gross pay will be reduced the amounts shown in Table
17. Categories 1), 2), 3) and 4) in the Table refer to the four options
discussed above, respectively.
Table 17
Contribution Required From Employee
Under Each Arrangement
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
5 years 1) 6.5% 6.1% 8.2% 7.4%
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
3) 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9%
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Cyclical 1) 5.5% 5.4% 6.1% 5.8%
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
3) 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2%
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%

The financial position of the employee in retirement will be the same,
except for the second option where the employee will fare less well.
For example, if the money purchase fund experienced 5 percent real
growth and the employees receive 1 percent real salary growth, the
fund of the employee moving jobs every five years would be able to
purchase a pension of 71.4 percent of the total service pension; the
cyclical employee's fund would be 89.3 percent of that necessary for
the total service pension.
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We need only consider the first, third, and fourth options. The third
option is the most expensive. The best alternative financially seems to
be the fourth option, where the employer contributes to the employee's
personal pension plan, because (assuming the assumptions are borne
out by experience) the employee receives the target pension and pays
the least contribution. The fourth option ignores the cost of other benefits provided by a defined benefit pension scheme (for example, the
cost of life insurance and the ill health pension). If these costs are included, the choice between the first and fourth options becomes more
difficult. In particular, as the benefit in the first option is provided
by a final salary pension scheme, the risk of the pension being lower
than expected because of poor investment performance is limited. With
the fourth option the risk of underperformance rests solely on the employee.
A revalued career average pension scheme would meet the target
benefit of both these categories of employee, provided revaluation was
in line with salary growth. If such a scheme is not available, then the
best chOice for both categories appears to be between:
• Joining a money purchase pension scheme where a reasonable
level of contributions are made by the employer and hoping that
the benefit of good investment performance will compensate for
the additional expenditure on insured benefits that might be necessary; and
• joining a defined benefit pension scheme final salary with the
certainty of a pension (and other benefits) which can be supplemented by additional contributions to compensate for revaluation
of deferred benefits at less than the rate of growth of salaries.
Few employers contribute to individual money purchase pension
schemes, and when employers have introduced occupational money
purchase schemes they have tended to pay lower contributions than
they would pay to a final salary pension scheme (NAPF, 1996). In practice, those employees with access to an occupational scheme are likely
to be in the second position; those without access to an occupational
scheme will have to choose the third option above, assuming they can
afford it. Again, the evidence shows that persons choosing to start individual money purchase pension schemes frequently pay a minimum
level of contribution and that there is a large proportion of the working
population with no pension provision other than that provided by the
state.
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Death in Service and Other Issues
Death in Service and Other Insurance Benefits

The results of Section 5 have ignored the provision for death and
other benefits provided by defined benefit pension schemes. This seems
a reasonable approach because, for some categories of employee, a
death benefit may not be important and may represent further cross
subsidy (from single members to those with dependents). Security for
dependents is important for a large percentage of the population, however, and should not be ignored.
The average death in service benefit provided by a defined benefit
pension scheme is a lump sum of approximately three times the annual salary at the time of death, together with a spouse's pension of 25
percent pensionable salary. This is unlikely to require a contribution
to a money purchase scheme much in excess of 1 percent of salary.12
The cost of the ill health (disability) pension is harder to estimate, but
could be as much as 4 percent of salary.13 These benefits could cost
more than the difference between the costs of the money purchase and
final salary pension schemes identified above. An obvious problem is
that those employees for whom such insurance is relatively expensive
are more likely to choose to join an occupational pension scheme, assuming one is available. This could increase the overall cost of defined
benefit pension schemes.
The cost of both these forms of insurance will increase with the
age at which contributions begin and also may increase throughout
the policy term. Money purchase pension schemes are likely to be relatively more attractive to younger employees, even ignoring the cost
of insurance, and this could be a problem for defined benefit pension
schemes. Employees could choose to opt out of occupational pension
schemes while young, expecting to be able to join their employers pension scheme when older. In the long run this could prove to be a poor
strategy because it will increase the average age of the membership of
occupational pension schemes, thereby increasing their average cost.
Because the provision of occupational pension schemes is voluntary,
employers may choose to close the pension schemes as the cost increases, leaving no pension scheme for aging employees to join. If
employers were able to make membership of pension schemes com12This figure was calculated assuming a term assurance for the lump sum necessary
to fund the benefit, allowing for the accumulated value of the money purchase fund.

13This amount was reached after some telephone inquiries to insurance companies.

36

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 5, No.1, 1997

pulsory, as was possible in the past, this problem at least could be
avoided. 14

6.2

Administration

Most employers effectively meet the cost of administering occupational defined benefit pension schemes. Sometimes they only do so
implicitly, as they usually meet the balance of the cost of the pension
scheme. In any case, it is important that administration costs are kept
to a minimum.
One problem is in data storage-in final salary pension schemes this
is frequently used as a reason for excluding part-time and temporary
employees because it can be difficult to record the number of hours
worked each week. Data handling software packages are making such
advances that this should become less of a problem. The only information that needs to be stored for a revalued career average pension
scheme, regardless of category of employee, is the total revalued salary
to date. This can be uprated annually, for example when tax statements
are produced. Consequently, any additional data handling can be kept
to a minimum for all employees.
In individual money purchase schemes the plan participant will have
to meet the expenses of the provider. In an occupational money purchase scheme it is usual for the employer to meet the expenses. Because
of economies of scale, the expense margins are usually lower for group
schemes.

7 Summary and Conclusion
While the assumptions and methodology underlying the calculations
can be criticized for their simplicity, they still serve to demonstrate
some useful results.
For many working histories, a defined benefit occupational pension
scheme can offer good value for money. Revalued career average pension schemes, where revaluation is in line with earnings, meet many of
the criticisms of final salary pension schemes.
14Legislation was introduced in the U.K. prohibiting companies from making membership of an occupational pension scheme a condition of employment because of their
perceived problems with portability. If the portability problems were addressed, there
should be less objection to compulsory membership.
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Final salary pension schemes compare poorly with money purchase
pension schemes in some circumstances. Their two main weaknesses
are:
• When salaries grow significantly faster than inflation and deferred
benefits are increased in line with inflation only;
• When interest rates are significantly higher than the rate of salary
growth and than assumed in the funding basis and the extra returns are not passed to the members of a defined benefit pension
scheme.
The former condition primarily affects employees who change jobs. In
some cases employees change employment because they perceive an
advantage to a new job. The employer, who meets the balance of cost in
most defined benefit pension schemes, may have trained the employee
and perceive a significant finanCial disadvantage to the move. Most
employers feel justified in providing a deferred benefit that gives less
weight to the years worked with the employer than a retirement benefit
would give.
Persons increasingly are leaving employment because they have been
employed on a temporary contract or because they have been made redundant. In these situations there may be no financial compensation
to the employee (other than a redundancy payment to those entitled
under employment law), but presumably there is a perceived benefit
to the employer. To penalize these employees further by reducing the
amount of the pension they can expect to receive at retirement is less
justifiable.
The results show that in certain circumstances the extra cost required to revalue deferred benefits in line with earnings is not great. For
an employee changing jobs every five years the cost calculated varies
between 1.1 percent and 3.2 percent of salary per annum. If employers do not want to increase the overall cost of an occupational pension
scheme, an alternative is to review the target benefit provided at retirement.
This brings us to another cross subsidy: between employees experiencing different rates of salary growth. By comparing the benefits provided by a revalued career average pension scheme and a final salary
pension scheme we see that in a final salary penSion scheme those
employees with flatter salary progression effectively subsidize those
with faster salary progression. The problem is one of equity: each employee's pension year should be identified and given a fair weighting in
the calculation of the eventual benefit paid which leads to a revalued career average design where the rate of revaluation is linked to increases
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in earnings. With this design the problem of deferred benefits would
disappear.
The second circumstance in which money purchase pension schemes
outperform defined benefit pension schemes is also a question of equity. To whom does the surplus in a penSion scheme belong if the employer meets the balance of the cost? If the contribution is perceived
solely as deferred pay, then the surplus belongs to the members of the
pension scheme. As the employer's contribution can fluctuate without
any regard to the progression of employees' earnings and, in any case,
it is calculated in a way that is not intended to be member specific, it
may be unreasonable to assume 100 percent of the contribution is in
respect of deferred pay. If this is the case, some mechanism for sharing the surplus between the employer and the members of the pension
scheme could be devised. This could depend on the extent to which
the employer has a commitment to meet payments where the pension
scheme is in deficit and on the normal cost of the penSion scheme as
reported in the Companies Act accounts.
If some categories of employees are to be paid higher benefits in defined benefit pension schemes without the overall cost increasing, other
employees will have to receive lower benefits. A final salary pension
scheme could achieve this by reducing the target benefit in a pension
scheme by redUCing the rate of accrual, while introdUCing revaluation
for deferred benefits in line with salary growth. This leaves the problem
of cross subsidy between different rates of salary growth. A revalued
career average pension scheme can address both problems by removing the proportionately larger rewards available in final salary pension
schemes to those whose salaries increase faster than the average. While
probably not removing all of the cross subsidy (because some index of
average salary growth will have to be adopted by the pension scheme),
the problem is at least controlled. It is also demonstrably equitable and
consistent with the idea of pensions representing deferred pay.
Personal pension plans will always have something to offer employees. For example, they can be much more flexible than occupational
pension schemes. In particular, the majority of persons in paid employment do not have access to occupational pension schemes. Money
purchase pension schemes cannot offer insurance to the same degree as
a defined benefit pension scheme. The results of this paper reinforce
the work of others (for example, Davies and Ward, 1992) in demonstrating the difficulties of relying on money purchase arrangements,
particularly for the less well paid. It is possible to develop a reasonably
straightforward pension scheme that can offer a fair level of benefit to
many different categories of employee.
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Appendix l-Glossary of Terms
Additional Voluntary Contributions-In the U.K., members of occupational pension schemes are allowed to make additional voluntary
contributions, up to certain limits of their salaries, in order to increase their benefits in retirement. The contributions attract the
same tax relief as ordinary contributions to a pension scheme.
Appropriate Personal PenSion Plan-If an individual chooses to contract out of the state earnings-related scheme through a personal
pension plan, the U.K. Department of Social Security pays part of
the individual's national insurance contributions to an appropriate personal pension plan. This is known as the contracted out
rebate. The contributions must be accounted for separately from
the plan participant's other contributions. More than half of the
persons who have personal pension plans only have an appropriate personal pension plan; that is, they do not make any additional
contribution beyond the rebate made by the Department of Social
Security (Williams and Field, 1993).
Basic State Pension-In the U.K. (and most other developed countries)
the government pays a pension to those persons over the state
retirement age who satisfy certain eligibility requirements. In
the U.K. eligibility depends on the number of national insurance
contributions paid. Within European Union countries the level of
this pension varies between approximately 15 percent of average
salary and 25 percent of average salary.
Limited Price Increases-In the U.K. the 1994 Pensions Act prescribes
that for pensions accrued after April 1, 1997, defined benefit pension schemes must increase the pension in payment by limited
price increases. That is, pensions in payment must be increased
by the minimum of 5 percent or the rate of increase in the Retail
Prices Index over a year.
Linked and Nonlinked Policies-The value of contributions paid to
linked poliCies will change according to an associated investment
fund. Depending on the fund chosen, the contributions will be
more or less secure. The value of nonlinked poliCies can only increase and will do so at the rate of bonus declared by the insurance
company.
National Insurance Contributions-In the U.K. the national insurance
contributions are a tax levied on employees and employers for so-
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cial insurance benefits provided by the state. Employees only pay
the tax (which is scaled according to the amount earned) on pay
under the upper earnings limit. The insurance cover includes, for
example, unemployment benefits and maternity benefits, as well
as the basic state pension and the state earnings-related penSion.
Occupational Pension Scheme-A pension scheme providing pensions
in respect to a period of employment with an employer participating in the pension scheme. The participating employer must
make regular contributions to the scheme. Employees of participating employers can join the pension scheme, provided they satisfy its eligibility rules. Many occupational pension schemes only
cover certain categories of staff; frequently temporary employees
or those working part time are excluded (GAD, 1991). Membership cannot be compulsory. Whether employees who choose to
join the pension scheme make contributions depends only on the
scheme rules. The pension scheme can be defined benefit or defined contribution.
State Earnings-Related Pension-Some governments provide pensions
in excess of the basic level described above. This pension is usually salary related, although it is common for the definition of pensionable salary used in the calculation to be capped. In the U.K.
the pension is called the state earnings-related pension scheme
(SERPS), and it is based on an individual's upper band earnings
[the salary between the lower earnings limit (approximately equal
to the basic state pension) and the upper earnings limit (approximately seven times the lower earnings limit)]. SERPS is effectively
a revalued career average scheme, with an earnings cap.

Appendix 2-Career Patterns
Using the information provided in studies such as those by Martin
and Roberts (1984) and Dex (1984), and after discussion with the Equal
Opportunities COmmission, Davies and Ward (1992) use the career patterns given below:
1) No Breaks-Employed full-time throughout working life.
2) Break and Part-Time-Employed full-time until a relatively few years
are taken from paid employment for child care followed by parttime employment until retirement.
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3) Break and Full-Time-Employed full-time until a longer break from
paid employment is taken for child care followed by full-time employment.
4) Break and Mixed-Employed full-time until relatively few years are
taken from paid employment for child care followed by a mixture
of unemployment, part-time and full-time employment, finishing
with a gap in the employment record.
5) Late Break-Only two periods away from full-time paid employment,
the first for child care, the second over the period up to age 60
for other types of family care. There is also a period of unemployment.
6) Late Start-A gap in paid employment until the mid-20s, followed
by full-time paid employment except for a short break for child
care.
(Davies and Ward, 1992)
The categories used in this paper are given in Table Al which summarizes the paid work in different five year periods. Thus, for example,
a "break-and-mixed" category employee is assumed to be working part
time in paid employment for 75 percent of the week between the ages
45 and 49. The full-time-and-bonus category is assumed to work overtime until age 45 and then to continue basic full-time work
Table A2 presents the time spent in paid employment by each category as a percentage of the maximum assumed possible of 40 years
and the total service pension accrued as a percentage of that accrued
by a full-time employee.
If the salary of each category of employee were assumed to grow
at the same rate regardless of whether the employee was in full-time
or part-time work or employed or unemployed, then the ratios of total
service pension to full-time pension would be the same as the ratios of
service. The differences occur because it is assumed that salaries grow
at different rates, depending on employment status. Table A2 indicates
the retirement income lost, relative to the full-time income, due to the
different working profiles.
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Table A2
Comparing Time in Paid Employment
And Total Service Pension
Total Service Pension:
Real Salary Growth of:
1%
2%
Service
Full-Time
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
51.9%
Break and Mixed
40.5%
31.6%
62.5%
53.8%
Late Break
46.4%
Break and Part-Time
63.1%
47.3%
35.5%
Early Break and Full-Time
75.0%
67.9%
61.5%
Late Break and Full-Time
75.0%
67.9%
61.5%
Short Break and Full-Time 87.5%
83.3%
79.3%
62.5%
53.8%
46.4%
Long Break and Full-Time
75.0%
67.9%
61.5%
Late Start
112.5% 100.0%
Full-Time & Bonus
100.0%
41.0%
Cyclical
50.0%
33.6%

Appendix 3-Results for Basic Pension and Average
Salaries
Most persons who have enrolled in personal pension schemes have
paid only the minimum contribution (that is, the contracted out rebate).
For someone earning an average wage in the 1995/96 tax year, this
amounted to just less than 5 percent of upper band earnings.1 5 Table
A3 shows that in many cases this level of contribution would provide a
pension not much greater than the basic state pension.
Table A3 also illustrates a potential problem that may arise due to
the British government's current policy of uprating the basic state pension in line with prices rather than earnings. In the discussion on money
purchase pension schemes, Table 14 demonstrates that the least beneficial experience for a money purchase pension scheme (of the bases
considered) was 4 percent real investment return and 2 percent real
lSUpper band earnings are those earnings between the lower earnings limit (£358 per
week in 1995/6) and the upper earnings limit (£440 per week in 1995/6). The state
earnings-related pension is based on upper band earnings.
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Table A3
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary,
Expressed as a Proportion of the Basic State Pension
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
Full-Time
184.1% 245.9% 216.6% 286.0%
Break and Mixed
99.2% 138.0% 105.8% 146.6%
122.3% 168.3% 134.9% 184.4%
Late Break
Break and Part-Time
110.9% 151.7% 118.3% 161.5%
Early Break and Full-Time 117.6% 153.6% 132.1% 170.9%
Late Break and Full-Time
127.3% 170.3% 142.5% 188.9%
Short Break and Full-Time 152.7% 203.4% 175.2% 230.7%
Long Break and Full-Time 106.8% 144.8% 116.8% 157.1%
Late Start
115.9% 149.7% 130.6% 167.4%
211.5% 284.3% 247.1% 328.5%
Full-Time & Bonus
Cyclical
93.0% 127.6% 100.3% 136.8%

salary growth. Here it appears that 4/1 is the worst. Similarly it appears 5/2 gives a lower pension than 5/1. This happens because the
basic state pension has been assumed to increase in line with prices
only. That is, the increase in salaries enters the equation on the asset
side (as increased contributions) only and not the liability side (where
it can represent increased standard of living).
We can present the pensions in Table A3 as a proportion of average
full-time earnings at retirement. The results are given in Table A4.
While the pension provided under the 4/2 assumption is a smaller
proportion of average salary than the pension provided under the 4/1
assumption, it is a larger amount. The assumption of 2 percent real
salary growth means that more contributions are paid to the scheme,
but not to such an extent that the pension can compensate for the larger
growth in average earnings.
The basic state penSion is currently about 15 percent of average
earnings. If real rates of salary increase 1 percent per annum, in 40
years the basic state pension would be only 10 percent of average earnings; if real salaries increase 2 percent, it would be 7 percent. Now
we can see the small amount of pension that some employees who contribute only the minimum amount to a money purchase penSion scheme
can expect to receive at retirement.
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Table A4
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary,
Expressed as a Proportion of Average Earnings
4/1
5/1
4/2
5/2
Full-Time
35.5% 47.4% 28.4% 37.5%
Break and Mixed
19.1% 26.6% 13.9% 19.2%
Late Break
23.6% 32.4% 17.7% 24.2%
Break and Part-Time
21.4% 29.2% 15.5% 21.2%
Early Break and Full-Time 22.7% 29.6% 17.3% 22.4%
Late Break and Full-Time
24.5% 32.8% 18.7% 24.8%
Short Break and Full-Time 29.4% 39.2% 23.0% 30.3%
Long Break and Full-Time 20.6% 27.9% 15.3% 20.6%
22.3% 28.9% 17.1% 22.0%
Late Start
40.8% 54.8% 32.4% 43.1%
Full-Time & Bonus
17.9% 24.6% 13.2% 18.0%
Cyclical

By gradually devaluing the basic state pension, the British government will find an increasing number of pensioners either accepting increasing levels of poverty or claiming income support. 16

16Income support in the U.K. is a means tested social security benefit paid to those
on low income.
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Seeking the Profitability-Risk-Competitiveness
Frontier Using a Genetic Algorithm
Ronnie Tan*

Abstract
Monte Carlo simulation is used to develop a flexible framework to measure
the profitability, risk, and competitiveness of any insurance product. A genetic algorithm is then used to seek the optimum asset allocations that form
the profitability-risk-competitiveness frontier and to examine the profitability,
risk, and competitiveness trade-off's. We also show how to select the appropriate asset allocation and crediting strategy in order to position the product
at the deSired location on the profitability-risk-competitiveness spectrum.
Key words and phrases: asset allocation, product positioning, risk-based capital,
Monte Carlo simulation, capital asset pricing model

1 Introduction
Monte Carlo l simulation has been widely accepted as a valid method
of valuing path-dependent cash flows. Hull (1993) applies Monte Carlo
simulation techniques to derivatives, Hayre and Lauterbach (1995) apply them to mortgage-backed securities, and Asay, Bouyoucos, and Marciano (1993) apply them to pricing single premium deferred annuities.
In recent years, asset-liability management actuaries also have begun
*Ronnie Tan, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., is an actuarial assistant in the Corporate Finance department at Equitable of Iowa Companies. He received his B.S. degree in actuarial science from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 1994. Since joining Equitable of Iowa
Companies in 1994, his assigmnents have included interest rate risk management, equity index annuity hedging, dynamic pricing, corporate financial projections, cash flow
testing, risk based capital, and surplus management.
Mr. Tan's address is: Equitable of Iowa Companies, 909 Locust Street, Des Moines, IA
50309-2899, USA. Internet address: rytan@equitable-of-iowa.com
1 For an introduction to Monte Carlo simulation in general see, for example, Kalos
and Whitlock (1986).
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using Monte Carlo simulation to value insurance company liabilities
and these liabilities' option-adjusted durations and convexities. 2
Although asset-liability management actuaries are using Monte Carlo
simulation in their work, product development actuaries have yet to
widely apply it. This is because Monte Carlo simulation techniques, as
they now exist, do not address the needs of the product development
actuary. In pricing their products, product development actuaries want
to know the following:
• Will the capital invested by the company earn more than the company's cost of capital?
• Will the risk of selling the product be acceptable?
• Will the product be competitive enough to meet the company's
sales target?
• How should the company invest in order to balance the above
three criteria?
The 1993 paper by Asay, Bouyoucos, and Marciano does not meet the
above needs for product development actuaries for the following reasons:
• Product development actuaries are concerned with distributable
earnings after considering the surplus required to satisfy both regulators and rating agencies. They are concerned with the liability
cash flows only when they impact distributable earnings.
• Profitability, risk, and competitiveness of a product must be considered in pricing. By matching durations and convexities, an attempt is made to minimize the risk component of the product. It
may be desirable, however, to take additional risk to enhance the
profitability and competitiveness of a product. Asay, Bouyoucos,
and Marciano formulated a profitability measure using optionadjusted spreads. Their measure is, however, defiCient because it
only requires an asset option-adjusted spread that is greater than
the liability option-adjusted spread. Though such option-adjusted
spreads may result in positive profits, they do not ensure that the
profits are sufficient to cover the cost of capital.
2For more discussion and detail on the market value of liabilities, see the American
Academy of Actuaries Task Force on Fair Valuation of Liabilities (1995), Merfeld (1996),
and Reitano (1997).
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• The investment allocation likewise must be considered in pricing. While asset-liability management actuaries extensively work
to determine the ideal asset allocation to back the liability, their
definition of "ideal" has always been that of minimizing risk. A
new definition that balances profitability, risk, and competitiveness is needed.
Section 2 introduces a framework through which profitability, risk,
and competitiveness of a product can be measured. In calculating profitability and risk, emphasis is placed on distributable earnings. 3 These
earnings are not only determined by the profit stream of the product,
but are also dependent on the target surplus required by regulators and
rating agencies. We use the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) risk-based capital formula as a proxy for the target
surplus needed to be held.
In Section 3 we provide a brief description of a genetic algorithm
and provide references for more detailed information. A genetic algorithm is then used to determine the ideal asset allocation for a single
premium deferred annUity. We show that there is no single asset allocation that can be considered ideal. Rather, we have a set of asset allocations forming the profitability-risk-competitiveness frontier. With the
genetic algorithm, asset allocations close to the frontier can be found.
Section 4 describes a method to quantify the profitability-risk-competitiveness trade-off's. Once these factors are quantified, deCisions on
where to position the product on the profitability-risk-competitiveness
spectrum can be made by restating the first three concerns of product
development actuaries as constraints on each of the three measures
defined in Section 2.

2

Profitability-Risk-(ompetitiveness Framework

For the n-th path of the Monte Carlo simulation, let ry,t,n denote
the yield curve path with y = 0.25,0.5,1,2, ... ,30 denoting the point
on the yield curve, t = 0,1,2, ... , T denoting the time period (be it
monthly, quarterly, or annually), and n = 1, 2, ... ,N denoting the path
number. Many models can be used to generate these paths. Under
each model, many decisions must be made about the values to be used
for parameters. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe and
3Distributable earnings are after tax statutory earnings plus changes in target surplus, Le., they are net cash flows facing the insurance company. They represent how
much the insurance company has to put in and how much it can take out from the
project (of selling the product).
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evaluate the various models available. The model selected should be
arbitrage free, however, and the values used for the parameters in the
model should be justifiable. Models that are not arbitrage free will
result in mispricing the various asset classes. Hull (1993) describes
some of these models.
Once the yield curve paths have been generated, an asset-liability
model is used to calculate the distributable earnings of the insurance
product. The asset-liability model will consider the asset allocation
used, the investment strategy under positive and negative cash flows,
the interest-crediting strategy of the product, the required target surplus, competitor rates, and mortality, lapse, and expense assumptions.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail asset-liability modeling.
Asay, Bouyoucos, and Marciano (1993) provide further detail on the
topic.
Let DEt,n denote the distributable earnings for time period t and the
path number n. The present value of distributable earnings for path n
can be calculated as
T

I

PVDE =
n
t;O

DEt,n

nk-;:'~(l + rO.25,k,n + s)M

(1)

where ~t is the length of each time period and 5 is the risk premium that
must be added to the risk free rate in order to arrive at the appropriate
discount rate for distributable earnings.
From the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the required
return on a project or a security, R, is given by

where RF is the risk free rate, {3 is a measure of the riskiness of the
project or security relative to the market, and RM - RF is the market
risk premium. If we assume that the product being priced has risk
similar to that of the insurance company as a whole, and the {3 of the
insurance company can be reasonably estimated, the risk premium in
equation (1) can be replaced with:

(2)
The market risk premium RM - RF has been estimated by Brealey and
Myers (1991, Chapter 8, page 161) to be 8.40 percent, resulting in 5 :=
0.084{3. Clearly 5 is similar to the option-adjusted spread of mortgagebacked securities as described in Hayre and Lauterbach (1995) and the

Tan: Profitability-Risk-Competitiveness Frontier

53

option-adjusted spread of single premium deferred annuities as described in Asay, Bouyoucos, and Marciano (1993).
The profitability measure now can be defined as the sample mean
of PVDE (Le., E[PVDE]) and the risk measure as its sample standard
deviation (Le., 51D [PVDE]), Le.,
N

Profitability Measure

.l L PVDEn

(3)

N n=l

Risk Measure

N

N

~1

L (PVDEn -

E[PVDE])2.

(4)

n=l

Finally, the competitiveness measure can be tailored to the type of product. It may be appropriate to look at the credited interest rate for deferred annuities and fund-based life insurance such as universal life.
For traditional life insurance we may want to use the annual premium
as the competitiveness criterion, while for immediate annuities we may
want to examine the periodic payments the policyholder will receive.

3 Genetic Algorithms: Overview and Example
3.1

What is a Genetic Algorithm?4

The birth of the genetic algorithm is generally attributed to Holland
(1975). Descriptions of the ideas behind these algorithms can be found
in Goldberg (1989).
Genetic algorithms are fundamentally different from classical algorithms. The differences are based on four principles (Goldberg, 1989):
1. Genetic algorithms use a coded representation of the parameters,
not the parameters themselves;
2. Genetic algorithms search from a population of solution vectors,
not a single solution vector;
4The description of a genetic algorithm used in this section is taken from Brigger (1995). Brigger's dissertation can be accessed on the World Wide Web at
http.//ltswww.epf/.ch/pub_files!brigger/thesis_html/node58.html. One can also visit genetic algorithm web sites such as http://www.aic.nrl.navy.mil/galist/for more information. Applications of genetic algorithms to actuarial investments are given in Barber
(1995) and Wendt (1995).
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3. Genetic algorithms exclusively use values of the function under
study and do not consider auxiliary information, such as the derivative; and
4. Genetic algorithms use probabilistic transition rules, not deterministic rules.
The function parameters-or the "living being" -are represented by
a structure called a chromosome. Genetic algorithms manipulate chromosomes to profit from and exploit similarities between different performing chromosomes. Genetic algorithms optimize a population of
chromosomes, unlike other methods that optimize only a single solution vector. The probability to select a false solution is reduced by
considering several solution vectors of high performance. Genetic algorithms remain highly general because their optimization is directly
based on the function values. There are no limitations set to continuous and derivable functions. Transition rules of genetic algorithms are
stochastic and not deterministic as in many other algorithms. Yet there
remains an important difference between genetic algorithms and random search algorithms, where decisions uniquely based on pure chance
guide the exploration. Genetic algorithms benefit largely from the available information within the current population and use chance only to
guide their exploration.
As in any optimization procedure, three associated objects are characteristic for genetic algorithms:
1. The environment of the system undergoing optimization;
2. The adaptive plan that determines successive structural modifications in response to the environment; and
3. A measure of the performance of different chromosomes in the
environment.
The first and third points are given by the problem, and the task of the
genetic algorithm is to control the mixture of operators that affect the
system undergoing optimization. Thus, the workings of the system are
conveyed in the adaptive plan which determines what chromosomes
arise in response to its environment. A given chromosome performs
differently in different environments, it is more or less fit, and it is the
adaptive plan's task to produce chromosomes that perform well (are
fit) in the environment confronting it.
The key problem for the adaptive plan is that it has absolutely no
information about which chromosomes are most fit. In order to ob-
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tain this information, the plan must test and evaluate different chromosomes within the environment. Based on the fitness of each, the
adaptive plan draws a selection. The adaptiveness is invoked when different environments cause different chromosomes to be selected. Successive structural modifications dictated by an adaptive plan amount
to a sequence or trajectory through the set of all attainable chromosomes. For a plan to be adaptive, the trajectory must depend upon
which environment is present.

3.2

An Example Using a Deterministic Genetic Algorithm

Suppose we have a single premium deferred annuity (SPDA) as described in Table 1 and an asset-liability model with assumptions as
described in Table 2. Furthermore, we have the ability to invest in the
types of assets as shown in Table 3.
Table 1
Description of SPDA
Policy Characteristics
Description
$1,000,000;
Premium:
$50,000;
Average Policy Size:
1 year for both initial and renewal rates;
Guarantee Period:
3.00%;
Minimum Rate:
7% year 1, declining 1% per year;
Surrender Charges:
10%;
Free Withdrawal:
5% of premium;
Sales Commissions:
0.1% of premium;
Issuance Expenses:
Administrative Expenses: $20 per policy per annum;
Death Benefit:
Fund value.

Given the specifications of the SPDA and the asset-liability model,
the goal is to determine the asset allocation that will satisfy the product development actuary in terms of profitability, risk, and competitiveness. With ten different types of assets, however, there is a wide
range of possible asset allocations to consider. This is where a genetic
algorithm is able to help. Genetic algorithms allow solutions to evolve
from one generation to the next, with the new generation of solutions
superior to the prior generation.
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Table 2
Asset-Liability Model Assumptions
Model Component
Assumption
25 years;
Projection Period:
200% of NAIC company action
Target Surplus:
level capital;
35%;
Federal Income Tax Rate:
1.00;
Company Beta:
1975-1980 SOA mortality rate;
Mortality:
50% male, 50% female;
Sex Distribution:
Issue Age:
60;
2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 30%,
Base Lapses:
10%,10% ... ;

Dynamic Lapses:

Considers difference between
competitor rate and credited
rate, and surrender charge remaining;

Maximum Lapses:
Competitor Rate:

50%;

Crediting Strategy:
Investment Strategies Under
-Positive Cash Flows:
-Negative Cash Flows:

Number of Scenarios:

Maximum of five year treasury
rate and 3.5%;
Subtract 220 basis points from
asset yield;
Invest in the same allocation as
the initial allocation;
Sell assets in proportion to their
market values at the time of
sale;
100, starting with the December 31, 1996 yield curve.
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To begin the genetic algorithm process, it is necessary to define the
first generation of solutions. One possible way is to define asset allocations that are 100 percent of each of the asset types. Table 4 shows
the results of these allocations. We observe the following from Table 4:
• The level of profitability is higher for A bonds, less for commercial mortgages, and least for BB bonds. Based on the NAlC riskbased capital formula, A bonds require the least capital, commercial mortgages more capital, and BB bonds the most capital.
• Investing in longer maturity assets will result in higher risk. In
general, the market values of longer maturity assets are more sensitive to changes in the yield curve. Because policyholders have
the option to surrender their policies at book value, the insurance
company is exposed to most of the fluctuations in the market values of the assets.
• Because of the crediting strategy of deducting a fixed spread from
the asset yield to arrive at the credited rate, assets with higher
yields will result in a more competitive SPDA. There is no requirement that the spread has to be the same for different asset allocations.

Type
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Table 3
Types of Assets Available to Invest
Spread Over
Treasury Curve
Asset
+35 basis points
3 Year Noncallable A Bond
5 Year Noncallable A Bond
+40 basis points
7 Year Noncallable A Bond
+45 basis points
10 Year Noncallable A Bond
+60 basis points
+165 basis points
5 Year Noncallable BB Bond
+185 basis points
7 Year Noncallable BB Bond
+220 basis points
10 Year Noncallable BB Bond
5 Year Commercial Mortgage
+140 basis points
7 Year Commercial Mortgage
+145 basis points
10 Year Commercial Mortgage +150 basis points

Note: All commercial mortgages have a 20 year amortization schedule.
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Table 4
Generation 1 Results
Asset Allocation: 100% in
Mean
3 Year Noncallable A Bond
15,654
5 Year Noncallable A Bond
11,346
7 Year Noncallable A Bond
6,391
10 Year Noncallable A Bond
3,377
5 Year Noncallable BB Bond
-11,018
7 Year Noncallable BB Bond
-17,287
-21,132
10 Year Noncallable BB Bond
-33
5 Year Commercial Mortgage
-1,496
7 Year Commercial Mortgage
10 Year Commercial Mortgage -1,074

STD
7,657
13,184
18,787
25,371
11,340
16,700
22,415
8,765
12,797
17,445

ICR
4.13%
4.35%
4.55%
4.79%
5.25%
5.59%
6.04%
5.48%
5.67%
5.81%

Notes: MEAN = Mean of PVDE; STD = Standard Deviation of PVDE; and

ICR = Initial Credited Rate.

To create the second generation of solutions, it is possible to select
any two first generation solutions and combine them. Thus, combining
a 100% Type 2 (Le, in 5-year-noncallable-A-bonds) allocation and a 100%
Type 8 (Le., in 5-year-commercial-mortgages) allocation will result in
an asset allocation with a 50 percent weight in each of Types 2 and
8 assets. With ten different allocations from which to choose, we are
able to create 45 (Le., C20)) new asset allocations to form the second
generation of solutions. After the second generation, with 55 different
asset allocations in our solution set we can create up to 1,485 (Le., (Sn)
different asset allocations to form the third generation of solutions. It
is impractical, however, to run the asset-liability model for so many
different asset allocations. Biased reproduction, based on the fitness
of an asset allocation, is imposed to limit the number of solutions we
have for the third and later generations.
Let 0 denote the set of all asset allocations that can be formed from
the ten asset types shown in Table 3. For an asset allocation j E 0, let
F(j) denote its fitness score, defined as:

(5)
where
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F(P) (j)

E[PVDE]j - E[PVDE]min
E[PVDE]max - E[PVDE]min

F(R)(j)
F(C)

(j)

SID [PVDE] max - SID [PVDE]j
SID [PVDE] max - SID [PVDE]min
ICRj - ICRmin

SID [PVDE]j
ICRj

(6)

(7)

(8)

ICRmax - ICRmin
E[PVDE]j
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Mean of PVDE for allocation j
Standard deviation of PVDE for allocation j, and
Initial credited rate for allocation j.

From Table 4 we obtain:
E[PVDE]max
E[PVDE]min

SID [PVDE] max
SID [PVDE] min

15,654
-21,132

ICRmax

25,371
7,657
6.04%

ICRmin

4.13%.

If there are two asset allocations j, k E Q such that F(P) (j) < F(P) (k),
(j) < F(R) (k), and F(C) (j) < F(C) (k), we say that asset allocation k

F(R)

dominates asset allocationj. When this occurs we force asset allocation
j to become extinct and eliminate it from our solution set. Asset allo-

cations that are not dominated by other asset allocations will remain
in the solution set. Only the fittest asset allocations (Le., those with
the highest fitness scores) of these survivors, however, will combine to
produce new asset allocations for the next generation.
A conscious effort is made to ensure that solutions across the profitability-risk-competitiveness spectrum are achieved so that the final
solution set is not concentrated in a small part of the spectrum. Also,
for diversity purposes, asset allocations representing as many different
asset types as possible are selected to reproduce. After six generations,
it can be observed that there is no longer much improvement in the
fitness scores, implying that the solution set is close to the profitabilityrisk -competitiveness frontier.
Tables Al through A8 in the appendix show all the asset allocations
in our solution set after generation six, while Figures 1 and 2 show the
evolution of our solution set from generation one to generation six.
Figures 1 and 2 are similar to the familiar efficient frontier of portfolio
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theory, except they contain an additional variable. Instead of an efficient frontier in the profitability-risk space, we now have an efficient
frontier in the profitability-risk-competitiveness space.
Figures 1 and 2 show that there is no asset allocation that simultaneously yields the highest profitability, the least risk, and the highest
credited rate. In order to achieve a higher credited rate for the SPDA, we
must reduce the profitability or increase the risk. We will now explore
these trade-offs.

4

Profitability-Risk-Competitiveness Trade-Offs

Figure 1 does not allow us to quantify the trade-off between risk and
competitiveness because the profitability measure has not been held
constant. Similarly, Figure 2 does not allow us to quantify the tradeoff between profitability and competitiveness because the risk measure
has not been held constant. To view the various trade-offs, we must
include all three measures in a single graph. Before we construct such
a graph, two points must be made:
• Not all of the asset allocations shown in the appendix are feasible. Although the profitability-risk-competitiveness profiles of
these allocations are sufficiently attractive to allow them to survive through all generations, some of these allocations may not be
in line with the investment policy of the insurance company. One
such policy may be the requirement that the asset allocation cannot be too concentrated in anyone asset category to reduce credit
and sector risks. Because the model used in this paper does not
consider such risks, there is a tendency for these risks to be ignored .
• We have assumed that the credited rate is determined by deducting 220 basis points from the asset yield. The spread of 220 basis
points is by no means magical, and the insurance company is not
bound to that number. The insurance company may even use a
different spread for each policy year. We now assume that the
spread can be any number. To simplify matters, however, we continue to assume that a level spread is used. For any given asset
allocation, changing the spread will change the profitability-riskcompetitiveness profile of that allocation.
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Figure 1
Initial Credited Rate Versus STD [P\lDE]
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Figure 2
Initial Credited Rate Versus E[PVDE]
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Figure 3 redraws the final solution set shown in Figure 2 with two
changes. First, the policy of limiting the combined allocation of BB
bonds and commercial mortgages to 50 percent of the asset portfolio
is imposed. Second, the spread of 220 basis points is relaxed to range
from 20 basis pOints to 420 basis points.
In Figure 3, points A, B, C, and the four points between them belong
to the same asset allocation, with spreads ranging from 20 basis pOints
to 420 basis points. The same case applies to points D, E, F, and the four
points between them. Limiting our choice to asset allocations having a
combined BB bonds and commercial mortgages allocation of not more
than 50 percent reduces our solution set to the line BE while allowing the
ability to change the spread to something other than 220 basis points
expands our solution set to the area inside ABCFED. Any point within
the area ABCFED can be reached by selecting an asset allocation along
the line BE and then changing the spread.
Figure 3 shows that when the spread is reduced to increase the credited rate, profitability is adversely impacted. Moving from point B to
point A increases the credited rate by 200 basis points from 5.08 percent to 7.08 percent, but reduces E[PVDE] from 5,695 to -55,876. Risk
is reduced as well when the credited rate is increased. As shown in figure 4, SID[PVDE] is reduced from 14,783 at point B to 4,690 at point
A. Crediting a high rate will make policyholders less likely to surrender
their policies in rising interest rate scenarios, thereby reducing the loss
from the sale of assets at low market values and making profits more
stable.
From the SID [P\lDE) values shown on Figure 4, it is possible to draw
rough equivalent risk curves representing the points on the profitabilitycompetitiveness space where the risk level is the same. As expected,
these curves have negative slopes which implies that if we keep the
risk level constant, the only way to increase profitability is to reduce
credited rate. The only way to increase credited rate is to reduce profitability. Also, by increasing the acceptable risk level (shifting to a higher
equivalent risk curve), we are able to increase profitability while keeping
credited rate the same, increase the credited rate while keeping profitability the same, or even increase both profitability and the credited
rate.
Figure 4 allows us to measure the various profitability-risk-competitiveness trade-offs. The trade-off between profitability and competitiveness can be obtained by moving along an equivalent risk curve; the
trade-off between profitability and risk can be obtained by mOving horizontally; and the trade-off between competitiveness and risk can be
obtained by moving vertically.
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Figure 3
Investment Policy Imposed and Varying Spread Allowed
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In Section 1, we introduced four concerns of product development
actuaries when doing their pricing work. We can use Figure 4 to address these concerns if we recognize that the first three concerns can
be restated as constraints on the three measures we have defined:

• Setting E[PVDE] greater than zero will ensure that the insurance
company earn more than its cost of capital;
• Setting S1D[PVDE] less than, say, 10,000 (this is just an example,
as the actual level will be subjective) will ensure that the risk level
is acceptable; and
• Setting the initial credited rate greater than, say, 5.00 percent
(again, this is just an example) will make the product sufficiently
competitive.
Once these constraints are placed on Figure 4, it will not be difficult
to determine the set of asset allocation/spread combinations that will
meet these constraints.
It is possible that when the constraints are placed on Figure 4, no
possible solution will be found because the area of interest falls outside the area ABCFED. When this occurs, either the constraints must be
adjusted to be more realistic or more asset types must be included in
the analysis to expand the solution set to an area larger than ABCFED.
The search for new asset classes is currently under way at many insurance companies as the competition they face intensifies. Some of
these new asset classes include asset-backed securities, credit derivatives, and emerging market debts. If the constraints cannot be adjusted
and no new asset classes can be found, the company may want to reconsider the feasibility of selling the product.
A new asset class may be superior to existing asset classes because
it is able to take advantage of loopholes in the risk-based capital formula. For example, an asset-backed security may be given an investment grade rating by the NAIC when the assets backing the security
are noninvestment grade assets. Thus, the insurance company buying
the security will gain from the higher yield without having to put in
the extra capital. Such loopholes will not last forever. Once regulators
become aware of the loopholes, they will take measures to correct the
situation.
Some insurance companies may try to increase profitability by reducing the amount of capital they use to fund their products. For example, they may deCide to change the target surplus they use from
200 percent to 150 percent of the NAIC company action level capital.
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Such actions eventually will result in downgrades of their ratings. When
downgrades occur the cost of capital will increase, and profitability will
decrease on a present value basis. Also, downgraded ratings will make
their products more difficult to sell. Maintaining the competitiveness
of their products will require crediting higher rates, again reducing profitability toward the original level.

5 Summary and Conclusion
This paper presents a flexible methodology that meets the needs
of product development actuaries. The methodology can be adapted to
any product as long as the distributable earnings for the product can be
modeled. Other asset types, including derivatives, can be added as long
as the asset cash flows can be modeled. The weighting of the various
components of the fitness score also can be adjusted to emphasize one
of the three measures.
The methodology is superior to the traditional pricing model in three
ways.
• The use of multiple scenarios allows the assessment of the risk of
the product. Under the traditional approach where a static economic environment is assumed, the risk of not achieving the required profit objectives due to changing economic environments
cannot be measured.
• The use of cost of capital that changes with the yield curve results in a more accurate profit measure. Under the traditional
approach, distributable earnings are discounted at a fixed percentage. This ignores the fact that earning 12 percent when the
90 day treasury rate is 5 percent is different from earning 12 percent when the 90 day treasury rate is 15 percent.
• The use of an asset-liability model allows us to determine the appropriate asset allocation to back the product. Under the traditional approach, assets are not modeled. As such, the product
development actuaries are not involved in the selection of the asset allocation.
The investment community has long been aware of the first two
weaknesses of the traditional approach. This is evident in the pricing
of mortgage-backed securities by Hayre and Lauterbach (1995) where
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Monte Carlo simulation techniques are used to overcome both the problem of path-dependent cash flows and the problem of discounting cash
flows at a fixed rate under different paths.
Asset-liability management actuaries have used the same techniques
to value liability cash flows and to calculate their durations and convexities. These models do not serve product development actuaries well
because little emphasis is placed on profitability and the competitiveness of the product. This paper combines the strengths of both worlds
and presents a general framework that can be adapted to any product.
Despite these strengths, areas exist where further research is needed.
Using the simple genetic algorithm described in this paper to seek the
profitability-risk-competitiveness frontier is found to be efficient. Genetic algorithms different from the one described in this paper, however, may be more efficient especially since the genetic algorithm we
use lacks randomness and mutations.
With the advent of more complicated products such as equity index
annuities and life insurance, the need for models to simultaneously
generate both equity and interest rate scenarios is compelling. Also,
studies on policyholder behavior under various equity/interest rate environments are needed to model the product more accurately.
CAPM is used to find the risk premium in equation (1). With all
the controversy surrounding the appropriateness of CAPM, more work
is needed to find a better method to calculate the risk premium. For
mortgage-backed securities where a broad market exists, the market
values can be used to back into the correct option-adjusted spread.
Without a market for insurance products, it will be a challenge to create
an accurate measure of the risk premium.
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Table At
Solution Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
10 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
3 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
BB
Comm
Comm
Comm
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
Bond
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
A Bond
15,654
7,657
100.00%
100.00%
-21,132
22,415
100.00%
-33 . 8,765
100.00%
-1,496
12,797
100.00% -1,074
17,445
14,046
10,264
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
8,098
7,520
50.00%
50.00%
6,605
11,884
50.00%
5,749
12,718
50.00%
50.00%
5,695
50.00%
14,783
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
-11,072
14,785
-11,531
17,157
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
19,760
50.00% -11,344
-423
50.00%
50.00%
10,483
50.00%
-121
12,798
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
-1,096
14,953
14,993
8,889
25.00%
75.00%
12,690
11,593
25.00%
25.00%
50.00%
25.00%
25.00%
7,442
8,507
50.00%
25.00%
25.00%
7,444
9,572
50.00%
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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5.01%
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Table A2
Solution Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
10 Year
7 Year
10 Year
5 Year
3 Year
7 Year
10 Year
5 Year
BB
Comm
Comm
Comm
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
Bond
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
50.00%
25.00%
6,658
10,747
25.00%
25.00%
75.00%
12,878
11,629
7,101
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
10,008
25.00%
7,063
11,066
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
50.00%
6,389
10,964
6,345
25.00%
25.00%
11,962
25.00%
25.00%
6,317
25.00%
11,814
50.00%
25.00%
2,746
25.00%
25.00%
13,194
50.00%
25.00%
2,181
14,202
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
2,222
25.00%
25.00%
50.00%
15,268
1,938
12,822
25.00%
75.00%
25.00%
25.00%
1,683
13,708
50.00%
1,724
25.00%
50.00%
25.00%
14,929
-11,081
50.00%
25.00%
25.00%
15,812
25.00%
-6,029
13,574
25.00%
50.00%
-5,831
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
14,728
25.00%
25.00%
50.00%
-5,779
16,005
25.00%
75.00%
-6,578
14,864
25.00%
50.00%
25.00%
-6,371
16,019
25.00%
25.00%
50.00%
-6,251
17,236
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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Table A3
Solution Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
7 Year
10 Year
5 Year
10 Year
BB
7 Year
10 Year
Comm
Comm
Comm
3 Year
5 Year
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
Bond
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
75.00%
25.00%
-123
9,532
75.00%
25.00%
10,745
69
11,582
50.00%
25.00%
25.00%
-230
-1,227
75.00%
25.00%
13,850
-1,036
16,132
25.00%
75.00%
8,242
15,372
87.50%
12.50%
12,114
7,552
25.00%
75.00%
11,762
8,064
12.50%
12.50%
75.00%
11,849
8,234
25.00%
12.50%
62.50%
11,518
8,728
12.50%
12.50%
12.50%
62.50%
7,800
8,004
37.50%
12.50%
50.00%
9,545
25.00%
12.50%
7,034
12.50%
50.00%
7,913
8,290
50.00%
12.50%
37.50%
7,324
9,760
25.00%
12.50%
12.50%
37.50%
12.50%
10,299
25.00%
7,297
25.00%
12.50%
37.50%
10,246
12.50%
25.00%
12.50%
6,939
12.50%
37.50%
12.50%
25.00%
6,898
10,753
12.50%
12.50%
37.50%
12.50%
7,098
10,525
25.00%
12.50%
25.00%
25.00%
2,422
12,981
62.50%
12.50%
12.50%
12.50%
75.0Q%
1,681
10,904
12.50%
12.50%
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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5.78%
4.15%
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Table A4
Solutiou Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
10 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
3 Year
7 Year
5 Year
10 Year
BB
Comm
Comm
Comm
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
Bond
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
A Bond
12.50%
62.50%
12.50%
12.50%
1,509
11,359
12.50%
25.00%
62.50%
1,555
11,916
12.50%
12.50%
1,302
50.00%
25.00%
11,839
12.50%
50.00%
12.50%
25.00%
1,361
12,385
87.50%
1,137
10,769
12.50%
1,083
12.50%
75.00%
12.50%
11,167
75.00%
12.50%
1,135
12.50%
11,805
62.50%
12.50%
25.00%
954
11,615
12.50%
1,016
12.50%
62.50%
12.50%
12,202
12.50%
12.50%
62.50%
12.50%
-3,596
13,663
25.00%
-3,501
12.50%
12.50%
50.00%
14,214
37.50%
-3,429
12.50%
12.50%
37.50%
14,782
50.00%
-3,383
12.50%
12.50%
25.00%
15,369
87.50%
-40
12.50%
9,115
87.50%
12.50%
79
9,747
12.50%
-17
75.00%
12.50%
10,109
62.50%
37.50%
-257
9,992
62.50%
12.50%
-146
25.00%
10,549
62.50%
25.00%
-77
12.50%
11,121
50.00%
12.50%
-311
37.50%
11,027
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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5.40%
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Table AS
Solution Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
10 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
10 Year
BB
Comm
3 Year
5 Year
7 Year
Comm
Comm
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
Bond
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
A Bond
62.50%
37.50%
-1,153
14,393
37.50%
62.50%
-1,056
15,532
12.50%
87.50%
-1,052
16,755
37.50%
62.50%
10,149
7,516
31.25%
62.50%
6.25%
9,986
7,759
25.00%
12.50%
62.50%
9,816
8,011
37.50%
6.25%
10,043
7,870
56.25%
31.25%
6.25%
56.25%
6.25%
9,884
8,109
37.50%
9,914
8,234
50.00%
12.50%
31.25%
18.75%
7,627
8,252
50.00%
50.00%
43.75%
6.25%
8,017
7,899
43.75%
6.25%
7,880
8,132
43.75%
6.25%
37.50%
12.50%
7,738
8,377
43.75%
6.25%
31.25%
18.75%
7,573
8,622
43.75%
6.25%
43.75%
6.25%
7,786
8,520
37.50%
12.50%
6.25%
56.25%
7,002
7,947
37.50%
31.25%
18.75%
50.00%
7,782
8,690
43.75%
31.25%
18.75%
6.25%
7,666
8,914
25.00%
6.25%
68.75%
4,497
8,845
6.25%
25.00%
62.50%
6.25%
4,412
9,065
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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4.63%
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4.84%
4.85%
4.84%
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Table A6
Solution Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
10 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
Comm
3 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
BB
Comm
Comm
A Bond
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
Bond
4,413
9,286
18.75%
6.25%
6.25%
68.75%
926
9,800
87.50%
6.25%
6.25%
10,002
6.25%
6.25%
883
6.25%
81.25%
10,301
924
81.25%
12.50%
6.25%
10,217
821
12.50%
6.25%
75.00%
6.25%
10,506
75.00%
6.25%
12.50%
863
6.25%
748
10,443
18.75%
6.25%
68.75%
6.25%
791
10,724
68.75%
12.50%
12.50%
6.25%
10,675
25.00%
665
62.50%
6.25%
6.25%
11,008
-1,650
31.25%
6.25%
6.25%
56.25%
-1,724
11,253
37.50%
6.25%
50.00%
6.25%
11,532
-1,674
31.25%
12.50%
6.25%
50.00%
-1,806
11,503
43.75%
6.25%
6.25%
43.75%
-1,753
11,779
43.75%
37.50%
12.50%
6.25%
-1,895
11,757
50.00%
6.25%
6.25%
37.50%
-1,841
12,031
43.75%
12.50%
6.25%
37.50%
12,019
56.25%
-1,993
6.25%
31.25%
6.25%
-35
8,925
6.25%
93.75%
40
9,248
93.75%
6.25%
9,415
13
87.50%
6.25%
6.25%
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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Table A7
Solution Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
10 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
10 Year
BB
Comm
Comm
Comm
7 Year
3 Year
5 Year
Bond
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
-74
18.75%
9,316
81.25%
-15
81.25%
12.50%
6.25%
9,610
6.25%
12.50%
27
9,912
81.25%
-66
9,814
75.00%
18.75%
6.25%
-185
68.75%
31.25%
9,759
-125
25.00%
6.25%
10,038
68.75%
-77
10,321
68.75%
18.75%
12.50%
-196
6.25%
10,269
62.50%
31.25%
-337
10,234
56.25%
43.75%
-276
56.25%
37.50%
6.25%
10,509
8,061
7,709
50.00%
46.88%
3.13%
7,265
8,072
53.13%
3.13%
43.75%
4,390
8,371
68.75%
3.13%
3.13%
25.00%
4,002
75.00%
7,804
25.00%
3,955
7,902
71.88%
3.13%
25.00%
65.63%
3,887
8,127
9.38%
25.00%
4,364
68.75%
3.13%
8,588
3.13%
21.88%
3.13%
75.00%
3,985
8,028
21.88%
3.13%
71.88%
3.13%
3,966
8,278
21.88%
3.13%
68.75%
3,913
6.25%
8,232
21.88%
3.13%
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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Table AS
Solution Set After Generation Six
Asset Types*
10 Year
5 Year
7 Year
10 Year
3 Year
5 Year
7 Year
BB
Comm
Comm
Comm
10 Year
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
A Bond
Bond
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE]
21.88%
3.13%
65.63%
9.38%
3,876
8,343
18.75%
3.l3%
71.88%
3.l3%
3,663
9,027
3.l3%
18.75%
3.l3%
56.25%
15.63%
3.13%
2,286
9,619
3.13%
18.75%
78.l3%
3,281
8,466
3.l3%
3.13%
18.75%
3.l3%
75.00%
3,265
8,720
18.75%
6.25%
3,220
8,669
3.l3%
71.88%
3.l3%
9,266
3.13%
93.75%
459
3.l3%
3.l3%
3.13%
462
9,362
90.63%
6.25%
3.l3%
90.63%
480
9,510
3.13%
9,557
3.l3%
84.38%
9.38%
438
68.75%
25.00%
3.13%
-852
10,147
3.l3%
-48
8,834
96.88%
3.l3%
96.88%
3.13%
8
9,005
93.75%
3.13%
3.l3%
-15
9,076
90.63%
9.38%
-32
9,020
90.63%
6.25%
3.13%
-8
9,169
3.l3%
-9
9,265
87.50%
9.38%
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations
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Fuzzy Underwriting: An Application of Fuzzy Logic
to Medical Underwriting
Per-Johan Horgby, * Ralf Lohse, t and Nicola-Alexander
Sittaro*

Abstract
One of the most difficult issues in the medical underwriting of life insurance
applicants is diabetes mellitus. Compiling the prognosticating parameters for
diabetic applicants results in a complex system of mutually interacting factors.
In addition, neither the prognosticating factors themselves nor their impact on
the mortality risk is clear cut.
We show how a fuzzy inference system can be used in underwriting diabetes mellitus. A fuzzy inference system can cope with the imprecise nature of
medical parameters by converting them into fuzzy sets and aggregating them
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using mathematical techniques. The fuzzy underwriting system presented
goes further than previous applications of fuzzy set theory in insurance, as it
is a real life application with contributions from insurance economics, insurance medicine, and computer science.
Key words and phrases: multiple risk factors, fuzzy inference, life insurance

1

Introduction

An important challenge in competitive life insurance markets is the
accurate underwriting of prospective policyholders. Underwriting in
life insurance is designed to determine and evaluate the individual mortality risk of new applicants for insurance, and for current insureds who
want to increase their amount of insurance. Underwriting quantifies
the potential adverse deviations from "normal" mortality and converts
them to higher premiums.
The resulting risk surcharge is justified by subjective factors such
as certain recreational and sport activities, professional factors such
as miners vs. white collar workers, and specific medical factors. More
specifically, medical underwriting is aimed at quantifying the current
and future mortality and morbidity risks arising from a health impairment and determining a premium commensurate with the overall risk.

1.1

Insurance Medicine

Since the early 1900s, insurance medicine has formed the scientific
basis of medical underwriting in life insurance (Florschiitz, 1914). It
has established the life-shortening of many medical conditions including obesity and hypertensive diseases. No other medical discipline is
involved with prognostic evaluations that span such long periods of
time. Long-term prognosis is the most important feature distinguishing insurance medicine from other fields of medicine (Deutsch, 1938).
Though this long-term approach is necessary because of the long-term
nature of life insurance policies, it may adversely affect the accuracy
of estimating a particular individual's life expectancy. Few other scientificstudies of human mortality, however, are designed to encompass
decades.
The established selection criteria used in the insurance business are
riddled with flaws. For example, the mortality and morbidity rates de-
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termined decades ago are not applicable today.l During the years between the application for a policy and its payout of the benefit, medical advances may significantly influence any predictions. Moreover,
the problem is exacerbated by the fact that insurers rarely can identify whether death can be attributed to the disease for which the risk
surcharge was once levied. Because of these weaknesses, insurance
medicine has increasingly oriented its prognoses on studies developed
using mathematical and statistical methods (Lew and Gajewski, 1990).
The disease-related prognostic findings are compiled in manuals for
reinsurance companies and provided to direct insurance companies. It
is the job of the underwriter to document the individual diseases of an
applicant and allocate them to a specific risk surcharge as defined by the
manuals. The problem with this task is that the information available on
a specific disease is usually not adequate for it to be accurately assigned
to a defined group with a known prognosis.
The basic problem can be illustrated with the diagnosis of chest pain.
This vague diagnosis applies to a large group. The sole risk surcharge
for a mention of the disease would be low, but it is unjustified for most
members of the affected group. If chest pain were subclaSSified further
as anterior myocardial infarction with moderate impairment of heart
pumping action, this diagnosis would apply to only a small portion
of the overall group. Hence, most of the applicants would be accepted
with a normal premium; the few with the anterior myocardial infarction
diagnosis would be rejected.

1.2

Common Problems in Underwriting

When the quality of information is poor, it is difficult to accurately
allocate diseases to rating classes. Obtaining detailed information creates a delay in processing time and an increase in costs. The costs are
imposing, when one considers the German experience: only 0.5 percent
to 1.0 percent of all life insurance applications are rejected, 2.0 percent
to 5.0 percent are accepted with a risk surcharge, and the 94 percent to
97 percent are accepted at the normal premium. 2 To achieve this result
(and depending on the insurance company), 15 percent to 25 percent
of all applicants are assessed in the underwriting department for extra
mortality risks. Most underwriting is superfluous, i.e. the risk is underIAn example is the Medical Impairment Ratings from 1932, edited by the Actuarial
Society of Anlerica and Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors.
2The German experiences are compiled by the Federation of the German Life Insurers, (Verband der Lebensversicherungsunternehmen E.V., Verbandrundschreiben Nr.
31,1992).
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written and the policy issued without any surcharge levied. To reduce
this superfluous underwriting, many German insurance companies are
developing and installing computer-assisted underwriting systems (Ueberscher et al., 1996).
A problem of quality also exists, a problem that has not been tackled
by computer-assisted expert systems. Table 1 shows the distribution of
diseases for applicants for life insurance in Germany. Whereas some of
the anomalies listed in Table 1 (such as hypertension and obesity) can
be assessed automatically during application processing at the insurance company, other medical problems are too complex for immediate
assessment. One disease that poses a key problem in underwriting is
diabetes mellitus, especially when it is manifested as type I (IDDM). Diabetes mellitus usually affects persons up to 30 years of age. Onset of
the disease is prior to the typical age at which most persons apply for
life insurance. But the disease is characterized by a multitude of different clinical courses most of which are associated with a markedly lower
life expectancy. There are unequivocal indicators for risk groups with
a particularly poor prognosis. It is imperative that these indicators be
surveyed and assessed within the scope of underwriting.
Table 1
Frequency of Abnormal Applications
In Underwriting life Insurance in Germany
Disease
Hypertension
Disorders of lipid metabolism (hypercholesterolemia)
Alcohol-related organ changes
Obesity
Diabetes mellitus
Heart disease
Asthma
Other

Frequency
18%
15
13%
12%
10%
10%
6%
16%

Source: Hannover Re, Karl-Wiechert·Allee 50, 30625 Hannover, Germany.

1.3

Outline of the Paper

The objective of this paper is to show how a fuzzy inference system
can be used in the underwriting of an applicant with diabetes mellitus
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for a life insurance policy. Fuzzy inference provides mathematical tools
for deriving a crisp (Le., non-fuzzy) output from a multiple fuzzy input
space. Fuzzy inference is useful in underwriting life insurance because
the risk attributes of medical parameters are not "either/or" variables.
An underwriting system based on fuzzy inference can cope with the
imprecise nature of medical parameters by converting them into fuzzy
sets and aggregating them. The fuzzy underwriting system differs from
other risk assessment systems because it allows for gradual shifts in
the input variables and allows for compensation between criteria.
In Section 2 we introduce a theoretical framework delineating how
fuzzy inference can be used to analyze risks in general and to scrutinize multiple prognostic factors in diabetes mellitus in particular. The
paper goes further than previous applications of the fuzzy set theory described in the insurance literature (see, for example, Lemaire,
1990; Cummins and Derrig, 1993; Ostaszewski, 1993; Derrig and Ostaszewski. 1995; and Young, 1996).3 The underwriting method is one
of the first computer-based fuzzy underwriting system being implemented in insurance. In addition, the paper takes an interdisciplinary
approach: It integrates the theory of fuzzy inference with the principles of insurance medicine and programming techniques in computer
science.
Fuzzy underwriting provides powerful tools for the risk assessment
of fuzzy and multiple prognostic factors. We believe that techniques
of fuzzy underwriting will become standard tools for underwriters in
the future.

2
2.1

Basics of Fuzzy Set Theory and Fuzzy Inference
Identification of Fuzzy Sets Over Membership Functions

To understand what a fuzzy set is, one must first understand what
a classical set is. In classical set theory, a set has a crisp (well defined)
boundary. For example, in a set of real numbers A, expressed as
A={xlx>10},

(1)

a clear boundary point exists at 10, i.e., if x is greater than 10 it belongs
to set A; otherwise it does not. This membership in a classical subset A
of X can also be viewed as a characteristic function J.lA from X to {O, I},
Le.,
3DeWit (1982) is probably the first to consider underwriting to be a potential area of
application of fuzzy set theory to insurance, but his analysis is not detailed.
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I iff x E A and A
iff x rt A and A

JiA (x) = { 0

<;;
<;;

X

X.

(2)

The definition in equation (2) implies that a classical set only allows full
membership or no membership. A fuzzy set is, on the other hand, a set
without a crisp (well defined) boundary. The transition from belonging
to a set ard not belonging to a fuzzy set is gradual and not absolute.
The membership function for a fuzzy set defines how each point in
the input space is mapped to a membership value between 0 and 1.
As a result, an element may belong to a set with a certain degree of
membership, not necessarily 0 or 1. The closer the value of JiA (x) is to
1, the more x belongs to A. A common characterization of a fuzzy set
A is
A = {(x, JiA) I x E X and JiA : X - [0, In,

(3)
where x is the element of interest, JiA is the membership function of x
in the subset A, and X is the universe of discourse.
The only condition a membership function for a fuzzy set must satisfy is that it has to vary between 0 and 1. The function itself can assume
an arbitrary shape and is defined from the point of view of SimpliCity,
convenience, and efficiency. Most common are monotonic, triangular,
trapeZOidal, and bell-shaped membership functions; see Figure 1.
Due to their SimpliCity, both triangular and trapezoidal membership functions are used extensively. As the membership functions are
composed of straight lines, however, they are not smooth at the transition points. The Gaussian and the generalized bell-shaped membership
functions are smooth and nonzero at all points and are appropriate in
cases where crisp transition points are misleading. To specify asymmetrical membership functions, the monotonic or sigmoidal membership
functions can be used. An asymmetrical membership function is appropriate for expressing concepts that gradually increase or decrease,
such as height or weight. 4
As the membership function is the essential component of a fuzzy
set, it is logical to define operations with fuzzy sets by membership
functions. Analogous to ordinary set operations, Zadeh (1965) defines
extended operations valid on fuzzy sets. The most important connections of verbal fuzzy expressions are the logical operations and and or.
4The assignment of membership function to the collection of objects X is subjective.
Therefore, there must be a rationale behind useful applications. Often the justification
of an assignment relies on COmmon sense, expertise, empirical knowledge, and so on.
In the fuzzy underwriting system, a medical expert has assigned membership functions
to corresponding fuzzy sets.
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Figure 1
Membership Functions

a) Triangular

c) rvIonotonic

b) Trapezoidal

d) Bell-Shaped

Consider the fuzzy subsets A and B of the universal set X. In fuzzy set
theory, and and or operations are defined with respect to the operators
1\ and v respectively as follows:
f.1A(X) 1\ f.1B(X) = min{f.1A(X),f.1B(X)}
f.1A(X) v f.1B(X) = max{f.1A(x),f.1B(X)}.

(4)
(5)

The intersection of A and B refers to the largest fuzzy set that is contained in both A and B. Analogously, the union of A and B refers to the
smallest fuzzy set containing both A and B.
The max and min operators have the disadvantage that the resulting membership value cannot assume a value between the maximal and
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minimal value, Le., extreme valuations cannot be offset by moderate
ones. The max and min operators consider only one of the two membership functions. There are other operators with qualities for union
and intersection that are different than those of max and min. These
operators vary in their generality and justification of the connections to
which they refer. Connectives consistent with the definitions for fuzzy
and and fuzzy or have been proposed in the literature under the names
T-norm and T-conorm operators, respectively (Dubois and Prade, 1980,
p. 11). By following the basic requirements according to T-norms and
T-conorms, the and/or operators can be customized as desired. As it is
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate T-norm and T-conorm, we
refer the interested reader to Zimmermann (1991, pp. 28-43), in B6hme
(1993, pp. 43-65), and in Klir and Yuan (1995, pp. 50-93).
2.2
2.2.1

Fuzzy Inference Rules By Generalized Modus Ponens
If-Then Rules

The basic rule of inference is modus ponens. 5 Using an "if-then" rule
and a premise, one can investigate the truth of a conclusion. Consider
the follOWing example:
Rule:
Premise:
Conclusion:

if x

E A

then y

E B

XEA

Y EB.

In this case of binary logic, the "if-then" rules are easy to follow. If

the premise is true, then the conclusion is true. We normally employ
the modus ponens in an approximate manner. The premise does not
correspond exactly with the antecedent in the "if-then" rule. To allow
for statements that are characterized by fuzzy sets, the modus ponens
must be extended for gradual numerical values.
Assume A and B are defined as fuzzy sets on the universes X and
Y, respectively, Le., A = {(X,I1A) Ix E X} and B = {(Y,I1B) Iy E Y}.
Now the modus ponens can be generalized as follows (Mizumoto and
Zimmerman, 1982):
5 Modus ponens means "demarcation inference" and belongs to the set of inference
rules in the syllogism
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if x E A then Y
x EA'
Y EB'

E

B

where A' is a fuzzy set. 6 The logic of this fuzzy example should be clear.
If the premise is true to some degree of membership, then the conclusion is also true to that same degree. In order to perform this generalized modus ponens, Zadeh (1973) proposes inference methods based
on fuzzy logic. In essence, fuzzy inference is based on two concepts: a
fuzzy implication (or fuzzy rule) and a composition rule of inference.
The fuzzy rule "if x E A then Y E B" expresses a relation between
the objects A and B. Without any loss of generality, we can define the
fuzzy "if-then" rule as a binary fuzzy relation; a fuzzy rule is defined
as the relation between the antecedent and the conclusion. For this
purpose, let Rxy denote a fuzzy relation on the product space X x Y,
then the fuzzy rule "if x E A then Y E B" is specified by the following
membership function:
(6)

where 1\ refers to the intersection operator defined in equation (4) as
the minimum connective.? We can complete the inference method of
the generalized modus ponens by applying the compositional rule of
inference (Zadeh, 1973).

2.2.2

Compositional Rule

Next we define the compositional rule on inference to be based on
max min composition. Let A, A', and B be fuzzy sets in the universes
X, X, and Y, respectively. Further, let Rxy represent the fuzzy relation
"if x E A then Y E E". Therefore, we express the generalized modus

ponens as
j.1R xy (x, Y)

V XEA' {j.1A' (x) 1\ j.1R xy (x, Y)}

m~min{j.1A' (X),j.1R xy (X,y)}.

(7)

XEA

6Throughout this paper, the prime notation is used to signify that the set is a fuzzy
set. Thus A' is a fuzzy set, not the complement of A.
7The binary fuzzy rule "if x E A then Y E B n can be interpreted as A is coupled
with B. This rule is an extension of the classical Cartesian product, where each element
(x, y) E X X Y is identified with a membership grade denoted by JiRxy (x, y).
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By applying this inference procedure we assign the conclusion a degree
of membership from the intersection of the premise and the fuzzy relation. Remember that max and min are just two of many other composition operators. It is possible to introduce other connectives: for
example, an algebraic product or more generally T-norms as and operators; and an algebraic sum or more generally T-conorm operators as
or operators. 8
As a general form of fuzzy inference, consider n multiple rules with
mUltiple antecedents combined with "else":
Rule 1:
Rule 2:
Rule n:
Premise:
Conclusion:

if x

if x E

if x
X E

or y
A2 or y

E Al

E

BI , then Z E CI else

E B2,

then Z

or y E Bn , then Z
A' and y E B'
E An

E

C2 else

E Cn

Z E C'

When dealing with mUltiple rules we are faced with a problem: more
than one rule can fire (take effect) simultaneously. To decide which
consequence should be taken as the result of the simultaneous firing
of several rules, we apply the process of conflict resolution (Berenji,
1992).
If A and B are the premise part, Le., the inputs in a fuzzy inference system, then their corresponding membership functions are represented by JiAi (x) and JiBi (y) for the i-th rule i = 1,2, .... The firing
strength, (Xi, of the i-th rule can be calculated by
(8)

The (Xi expresses the matching strength of the antecedents for each
rule. By applying this strength on respective conclusions, we obtain
the inferred fuzzy sets for each rule,
Jic~ (z) = (Xi /\ JiCi (Z).

(9)

!

As a result of the inputs A' and B', the inference of Rule 1 generates
the conclusion Jic'1 (z), Rule 2 generates Jic'2 (z), and so on. Thus, each
8When a fuzzy rule takes the form "if x E A or y E B then Z E C," the degree
of fulfillment of this fuzzy rule is given as the maximum degree of a match with the
antecedent part.

Horgby et al: Fuzzy Underwriting

89

rule suggests a different output. To resolve this dilemma, the conflictresolution process recommends that the conclusions of respective rules
be aggregated by the union operator. We can derive the aggregate output C' as
Pc' (z)

[lXl /\

PCI (z)] V [lX2 /\ PC2(Z)]

v ...

Pc; (z) /\ Pc~ (z) /\ ... /\ Pc~ (z).

V [lXn /\

PCn (z)]

(10)

The connective "else" is interpreted as the logical or. The or is interpreted as the max operator. Hence, the final output is calculated by
aggregating results from each rule using the max operator.

2.3

Defuzzification Strategies

The implication of equation (10) is characterized by a membership
function, i.e., the output of the fuzzy inference is a fuzzy set as well.
Often it is necessary to receive an output in crisp terms. Therefore,
the membership function of the final output must be translated, i.e.,
defuzzified, a single criSp value. A defuzzification strategy refers to the
way a crisp value is extracted from a fuzzy output set. Several defuzzification strategies have been suggested in the literature (see Jager et al.,
1994, pp. 179-185). We describe the most popular method called the
center of area (coa) method. This defuzzification strategy returns the
center of area under the membership curve as
Zcoa

2.]=1 ZjPc' (Zj)
= --"-nq-=-----C..-

2.j=l Pc' (Zj)

(11)

where Zcoa is the defuzzified output, q is the number of quantification levels of the output, Zj is the amount of output at the quantification level j, and Pc' (z j) is the aggregated output membership function.
This defuzzification strategy is simply a weighted average of the z/s
(similar to the expected value of probability theory). A common feature
of this method and the computation of expected values is the nondiscrimination of extreme values. The center of area calculation is made
on the basis of all aggregated outputs without eliminating endpoints.
Other defuzzification strategies (such as mean of maximum, largest
of maximum, and smallest of maximum) do not consider the parts of a
fuzzy output, the membership values of which are below the maximum.
Defuzzification can be performed in several arbitrary ways. Different
strategies arise for specific applications. There is no accurate way to
analyze them except through experimental studies.
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3 A Computer-Based Fuzzy Underwriting System
We provide one description of how expert knowledge about underwriting diabetes mellitus in life insurance is processed for a fuzzy inference system. The system was developed and programmed in MS Excel
5.0 using Visual Basic. The rationale of the system relies on medical
knowledge concerning the etiology of diabetes mellitus and underwriting principles in insurance economics.

3.1

Prognosticating Diabetes Mellitus

The list of prognostic parameters for diabetes mellitus is long. There
are primary and secondary medical parameters, and an accurate assessment of the prognosis can be made taking into account a limited
number of parameters.
Diabetes mellitus is characterized by an elevation in blood sugar
values. In type I diabetes mellitus, this blood sugar elevation is caused
when the pancreas secretes no insulin. Type II diabetes mellitus, which
chiefly affects persons over age 30, has an underlying pathological mechanism, whereby, despite the fact that the pancreas secretes insulin, the
activity is suppressed. If not treated successfully either by drugs or
insulin replacement, life-threatening conditions will occur within a few
days. Renal impairment occurs in type I diabetics, which often leads to
kidney failure as early as 10 years to 20 years after onset. In general,
the blood vessels in diabetics are damaged; heart attack, stroke, and
neural and eye impairment are common complications (Mehnert et al.,
1994, pp. 76-78). The prognosis in diabetes mellitus can be based on
three primary factors (Rossing et al., 1996, Nathan, 1993): (i) the time
factor; (ii) the therapy (adjustment) factor; and (iii) the complication
factor.
If complications such as kidney failure, eye disorders, or heart attack are manifest, the underwriting normally ends in rejection of the
applicant. While in the past, the insurer chiefly applied the time factor
when underwriting a risk, new medical research increasingly has shown
the importance of the therapy factor. The time factor ultimately reveals
that the insurance company is only willing to accept an application for
life insurance with a risk surcharge if the duration of the diabetes plus
the applied term insurance do not exceed a specified period of time.
In such a case, staggered risk surcharges are assigned for a period of
15 years to 35 years. Numerous case studies have shown, however,
that the better the diabetes mellitus can be treated with insulin so that
blood sugar levels approximate the level and course of a healthy per-
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son, the lower the organ-related complication rate will be. These special
forms of therapy cannot be given to every diabetic. Underwriting thus
consists of evaluating as accurately as possible the quality of this therapy in terms of the adjustment parameters and excluding any possible
complications by achieving a high quality of information (Mehnert et al.
1994, pp. 93, 131).
The quality of therapy can be established by current blood sugar values and the HbA1-values (glycolysated hemoglobin). The HbA1-value
can be determined easily in the blood and reflects the blood sugar level
over a period of around 90 days. These two parameters of insulin
therapy-or other treatment strategies in type II diabetics-define the
adjustment by medication or therapy efficiency.
Another important aspect to consider in patients with diabetes mellitus is that the more cardiovascular risk factors are present, the worse
is the mortality risk. These factors include elevated blood lipids, high
blood pressure, or smoking, These risk factors also must be reviewed
within the scope of any prognostic assessment. In addition to these
main parameters, several other prognostic factors are important for an
adequate risk evaluation of diabetes mellitus.
Table 2 lists the prognostic factors that form the input space in our
underwriting system. These prognosticating factors for diabetes mellitus result in a complex system of interdependent variables that mutually interact. All changes can be identified with regard to their effect
on the overall prognosis for increased mortality. The prognosticating
factors and their impact on the mortality risk is not clear cut.

3.2

Design of the Fuzzy Underwriting System

To depict the knowledge concerning the etiology of diabetes mellitus, the major areas were processed in chronological order:
1. Hierarchical structure of the prognosticating variables;

2. Membership functions of the terms of the prognosticating variables; then
3. Rule base.
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Table 2
Prognostic Factors in Diabetes Mellitus
27 Factors
Age of the patient
Age at onset of the disease
Duration of the disease
Type I or type II diabetes
Quality of the therapy (with medication)
Blood sugar level
Blood sugar profile
HbAl
Fructose amine concentration in the blood
Sugar detected in the urine
Compliance with dietary recommendations
Compliance in taking medicine
Insulin dose
Frequency of daily blood sugar checks
Intensified insulin therapy
Intercurrent complications in diabetes
Myocardial infarction
Coronary heart disease
Peripheral vascular disease
Eye disorders
Renal function
Blood pressure
Body weight
Frequency of hospitalization because of coma
Extent of blood sugar fluctuations
Profession
Education
Sources: Rossing et al. (1996), Borch-Johnson (1987),
Panzram (1987), Nathan (1993).
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First, the three primary factors attributed to diabetes mellitus (therapy factor, time factor, and complication factor) are subdivided into influencing factors on the subordinate level. This process of hierarchical
top-down classification was repeated until input factors were present
on the first level that either
• showed a continuous dimension (e.g., blood sugar level in milligrams per deciliter) or if such a dimension were lacking; or were
• subject to discrete evaluation by the medical expert (e.g., classification of vascular complications into minor, moderate, marked,
or severe).
If a continuous dimension exists, the medical expert determines
the values for which terms of language have no membership, Le., the
membership equals 0, and those have complete membership, Le., the
membership equals 1. A linear course of the membership function was
defined between the mathematical items for no membership and complete membership defined in this way. If a discrete natural dimension
existed for a variable, only complete membership values relating to one
of the terms of the linguistic variables could be present. For example,
retinopathy can only be present in either stage 1, 2, 3, or 4. In this
way, the structure of the fuzzy inference system and all the system's
elements are defined.
The next step is connecting these membership values according to
a given structure. For this purpose, the expert is required to define
rule sets {Rl, R2, ... , Rn} for all allocations within the fuzzy inference
system. 9 The rule sets must account for all possible combinations from
the terms of subordinate variables. For example, the variable "blood
sugar level" and "HbAl-value" are defined by five terms each; in other
words, 25 rules must be defined.
Each of the individual rules consisted of an antecedent and a conclusion. The antecedent includes the terms of the subordinate variables
9The expert knowledge is often referred to as a knowledge base of a fuzzy inference
system. Most often the knowledge base also contains a set of rules that specifies the
output as a function of a fuzzy input space. In general, there are four methods of rule
generation (Sugeno, 1985):
i) Experience and knowledge of an expert;
ii) Modeling the operator's control actions;
iii) Qualitative modeling of a system; and
iv) Self·organization.
The first method is the most widely used, and it is the rule base used in this application.
For a review of the other methods, see Sugeno (1985) or Klir and Yuan (1995, pp. 327356).
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and the conclusion includes the terms of the superior variable. In general, a rule takes of the form of: "If {variable l} is {term set l} and
{variable 2} is {term set 2}, then {consequence l} is {term set 3}".
An example of a rule is: If the blood sugar level is very low and
the HbAl-value is normal, then the blood sugar profile is to be rated
as medium. The structure of the total system is illustrated in Figure
2. On the left in Figure 2 we see the final output: the risk-adjusted
premium. The lower risk factors extra mortality and age represent actuarial factors to calculate the extra premium for substandard risks.
While age is an original input factor, extra mortality is inferred by the
three primary factors attributed to diabetes mellitus: therapy factor,
complication factor, and time factor. All other medical risk factors
are regarded as fuzzy subfactors. To explain the whole fuzzy inference system would not make any sense in this limited space. We make,
therefore, an arbitrary demarcation in the presentation and consider
only how the therapy factor is inferred.

3.3

Inferring the Therapy Factor

From Figure 2, we see that the therapy factor is inferred by three
original input factors (blood sugar value, HbAl-value, and insulin injections) connected in two places. Let us show in more detail how the
therapy factor is determined by considering an applicant who has the
profile described in Table 3.
Table 3
Applicant Profile

Factors
Blood sugar value
HbAI
Insulin injections

Level
130 mg/dl
13.5%
10 per week

Figure 3 demonstrates how blood sugar value, HbAl, and number
of insulin injections are allocated to the terms of the variables (in other
words, how the inputs are fuzzified). The blood sugar value of 130
mg/dl has the membership values 0.67 as normal and 0.33 as high. No
other terms fire for 130 mg/dl. The HbAl-value of 13.5 percentage has
the membership values 0.75 as high and 0.25 as very high. The number
of 10 insulin injections per week has the membership values 0.57 as
low and 0.43 as medium.
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Figure 2
A Fuzzy Inference System for Underwriting Diabetes Mellitus
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Figure 3
A Pictorial Representation of the Inference Rules
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In inferring the therapy factor, we must make two inferences. The
first inference is to connect the blood sugar value with the HbAl-value
and thereby infer the blood sugar profile. In the second inference, we
connect blood sugar profile and insulin injections. This yields the therapy factor, which in turn has to be defuzzified into a premium surcharge. These two inference steps are illustrated in Figure 4.
The rule sets of inference 1 and inference 2 are given in Tables 4
and 5. In our example, we only consider rules that have positive membership values. In rules in which at least one term in the antecedent
has a membership value of zero, then a membership of zero results for
the conclusion. These rules have no effect on the further processing of
information and, therefore, are not represented by numerals in the rule
sets.
The operators in the rule base are defined to be the max and min
functions, respectively, similar to the inference system proposed by
Mamdami (1976). Such an inference method is called max-min inference, because the membership function of the aggregated output is the
union (max) of the fuzzy sets assigned to that output after cutting their
degree of membership values at the degree for the corresponding antecedents by the intersection min operator.
After the inference of blood sugar profile and insulin injections we
receive the inferred output therapy factor. The last step is to translate,
or defuzzify, the therapy factor into a crisp premium surcharge. In Figure 4, we see that the firing strength of the medium premium surcharge
rule is 0.57 and 0.25 for the high premium surcharge rule, which means
that the membership functions of the medium premium surcharge and
high premium surcharge are cut at 0.57 and 0.25, respectively. This is
illustrated in Panel B in Figure 5. Thereafter, a total function is produced from both firing rules.
From the resulting fuzzy output set (Panel C in Figure 5) we use
the center of area method defined in equation (11) to extract a crisp
premium surcharge. This applicant must pay a premium surcharge of
207 percent on top of the class rate. The underwriting is now complete,
and the gradual risk of diabetes has been translated into a premium
surcharge using fuzzy set theory and fuzzy inference. Allowing for
gradual shifts in the input space makes this system fle~ble and gives a
better mapping of individual risk profiles than classical expert systems.
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Table 4
Fuzzy Inference of Blood Sugar Values and HbAI
Antecedents
Conclusions
Rule BSV
MY HBA1
MY BSP
MY
1
very low
very low
bad
low
very low
2
bad
normal
very low
3
bad
high
very low
4
bad
very high
very low
5
bad
medium
very low
low
6
7
low
low
medium
medium
normal
low
8
high
low
medium
9
medium
very high
10
low
medium
very low
normal
11
low
normal
normal
12
normal
normal
13
normal
high
normal
normal
14
medium
very high
normal
15
high
medium
very low
16
medium
high
low
17
0.67
normal
0.67 high
0.75 medium
18
high
0.75 medium
0.33
0.33 high
19
high
very high
medium
20
very high
very low
bad
21
very high
22
low
bad
normal
0.67 very high 0.25 bad
0.25
23
0.25
high
24
0.33 very high 0.25 bad
very
high
very
high
bad
25
BSV = Blood Sugar Value; BSP = Blood Sugar Profile; and MY = Membership Value.
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Summary and Concluding Remarks

We introduce a new inference technique, called fuzzy inference, for
underwriting in life insurance. Fuzzy inference systems are well suited
for compiling medical facts and can help underwriters cope with the
complexity of prognostic decision making. Fuzzy logic presents medical information more realistically than do the classical methods. Medical practice has had to rely on auxiliary constructions for prognostic
parameters by forming intervals of demarcation to increase practicability. These intervals in effect convert continuous functions into discontinuous ones.
Table 5
Inference of Blood Sugar Profile and Insulin Injections
Antecedents
Conclusions
THEF
Rule BSP
MY
MY
MY
INU
good
1
normal
low
good
medium
2
normal
high
good
normal
3
good
very high
4
normal
0.57 medium
0.57
medium 0.67 low
5
0.43 medium
0.43
medium 0.67 medium
6
high
good
7
medium
good
very high
medium
8
0.25
0.57 bad
9
bad
0.25 low
0.25
0.43 bad
10
bad
0.25 medium
high
medium
11
bad
very high
medium
12
bad
BSP = Blood Sugar Profile; INU = Insulin Injections; THEF = Therapy Factor;
and MY = Membership Value.

Another feature of medical descriptions is their fuzziness. It is easy
to reach a consensus among physicians that a disease or a symptom
is mild, moderate, or severe. A quantitative expression of these fuzzy
terms is not normal practice in medicine, but is necessary to be able to
make precise prognostic statements. Fuzzy inference systems provide
an excellent approach to reaching such solutions.
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Figure 5
Defuzzification of the Aggregated Premium Surcharge
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The fuzzy underwriting system presented here has been used in
practical applications. It shows that the fuzzy language of physicians
combined with fuzzy prognostic parameters can be expressed as fuzzy
inference rules and, thus, be implemented as criSp decisions. Using
fuzzy underwriting, more prognostic factors can be taken into account
than are currently possible in underwriting practices of direct insurance
companies. The prognosis of disease is generally not determined by one
factor alone, but by a combination of factors.
Even in the early versions of the fuzzy underwriting system, practical cases from everyday insurance could be used to show that correct decisions are possible in about 80 percent of all cases. The remaining 20 percent does not result from weakness of the system, but
from deficiencies in the information available. The PC-supported system presented also makes decisions when the information available
is sparse. Such decisions are naturally less reliable. Prognosis structures can be constructed for many diseases analogously to our example of diabetes mellitus. Fuzzy inference systems can be devised for
most diseases. For direct insurance companies, such fuzzy systems
would make decision-making process more preCise, more transparent,
and more free of the subjective errors that have hindered accurate underwriting assessments in the past.
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Accelerated Death Benefits, Viatical Settlements,
and Viatical Loans: Options for the Terminally III
Paula Schmidt*

Abstract t
There are three options available for terminally ill insureds who are interested in accessing all or part of the face value of their life insurance policies:
through the life insurance company (accelerated death benefits), through a viatical company (a via tical settlement), or through a via tical loan company (a
via tical loan). This paper explores the definitions and tax regulations, calculations, and the claims process associated with accelerated death benefits and
via tical settlements and loans.
Key words and phrases: life expectancy, claims, taxes, regulations

1 Introduction
For a person diagnosed with a terminal illness, there are few monetary options available to pay the expenses needed to sustain his or
her life. Medical insurance may only cover expenses up to a limit, and
their savings and/or possessions may not be enough to cover bills. For
the insured terminally ill, however, there are often three other options:
accelerated death benefits, viatical settlements, or via tical loans.
*Paula Schmidt works in the priCing/product development department at Lincoln
Benefit Life Company. She completed her B.S. degree in actuarial science in 1995 from
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and is currently working toward her associateship
and eventual fellowship in the Society of Actuaries. This is her first published work.
Ms. Schmidt's address is: Lincoln Benefit Life, PO Box 80469, Lincoln NE 68501-0469,
USA. Internet address: schmipat@allstate.com
tThis paper is based on the honors thesis that Ms. Schmidt completed for her B.Sc.
degree in actuarial science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. She is grateful for
comments from an anonymous referee, the editor, and Mr. Daniel Kahan, A.I.A., A.S.A.
of Canadian Life Line.
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Accelerated death benefits are benefits offered by life insurance companies to terminally ill insureds. The proceeds from an acceleration
result from a recalculation of the insured's life expectancy due to the
terminal illness and can be excluded from the owner's personal gross
income under current tax law. The proceeds consist of a fraction (typically 50 percent, but can vary from 25 percent to 100 percent depending
on the company) of the policy's face value, the remainder being paid at
the time of death. There is sometimes a waiver of premiums during the
period the insured is expected to die. If the insured survives the period,
there may be a resumption of premiums. Whether the premium needs
to be resumed is company specific and is stated in the policy or rider
form that contains the accelerated benefit provision.
The risk insurance companies take when they fund accelerated death
benefits differs from the risk insurance companies assume at the sale
of a life insurance policy. There is minimal adverse mortality risk involved in accelerated death benefits, if the physician's diagnosis is correct, given the likelihood of death occurring in the near future. Thus,
the risk assumed is primarily an investment risk.
A viatical settlement is one in which the owner of a life insurance
policy sells the policy to a viatical company for an amount less than the
face amount. The amount paid is directly related to the amount of time
the insured is expected to live, Le., the longer the life expectancy, the
less the amount paid. The viatical company in turn pays the remaining
premiums needed to keep the policy in force.
If the person lives longer than expected, viatical settlement companies will suffer a decrease in their investment return. Thus, viaticals
risk losing some of their profit. If they are highly leveraged, this could
be a large percent of that profit.
A viatical loan involves a policyowner giving collateral assignment
of his or her life insurance policy to a viaticalloan company. The loan is
then repaid in full at the time of death of the insured. The premiums are
paid by the viaticalloan company and are subtracted from the viatical
loan amount in the initial computation. Often, a via tical loan allows the
policyowner to receive more of the death benefit than an accelerated
death benefit or viatical settlement. At the death of the insured, the
balance of the death benefit is paid to beneficiaries.
The benefit covered in this paper is the terminal illness-triggered
benefit. To be eligible for this benefit, a physician must certify that
death is imminent within a specified time period. This time period is
usually six months to a year, though 24 months is the requirement in the
Internal Revenue Code for a benefit to be treated in a manner similar to
life insurance proceeds. Therefore, a terminal illness-triggered benefit
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is any payment made from a life insurance policy while the insured is
alive that results from recalculating the insured's life expectancy due
to the terminal illness.

2
2.1

Life Insurance Companies
The Calcu lation of Accelerated Death Benefits

There are two common methods used to calculate accelerated death
benefits: discounting the face value (less any outstanding policy loans)
of the policy or by taking a lien against the policy. Other methods are
used, but they are not as acceptable to most life insurance companies.
The discounting method requires the face value of the policy to be
discounted by a factor related to current market rates (e.g., the u.s. Treasury bill rate) and the length of the acceleration period. The amount
paid is subtracted from the face amount of the policy, which results in
a lower remaining death benefit. In some cases, companies waive the
premium during acceleration. Some life insurance companies charge an
administrative fee to cover the expenses of processing the acceleration.
Typical fees range from $100 to $300.
A simple example of discounting an accelerated death benefit follows. Assume a policy with a $100,000 face amount, a 60 percent acceleration benefit, no loans, a company-implemented administrative fee
of $200, and a Treasury bill rate of 8 percent. The insured is assumed to
have a year to live. The amount to cover the interest on the accelerated
portion is:
$60,000 - ($60,000/1.08) = $4,444.44.
Therefore the accelerated payment is:
$60,000 - $200 - $4,444.44

=

$55,355.56.

The policy would remain in force with a $40,000 death benefit.
In the lien method, the accelerated benefit is treated as a loan secured by the policy. Once death occurs, the loan is reimbursed with
interest from the entire death benefit. The difference between the lien
method and a straight policy loan is that for the lien method, advances
can exceed the contract's cash value. With a loan, however, the policyowner only is able to obtain an amount not higher than the cash value
of the policy.
Let us now look at a lien method example using the same scenario as
for discounting, with the exception that the 8 percent Treasury bill rate
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is assumed to be the loan rate and there is a $200 administrative fee.
The policyowner would be loaned $59,800 ($60,000 - $200) now. The
death benefit remaining, assumed to be paid in one year's time, would
be:
$100,000 - ($60,000 1.08) = $35,200.

*

The difference between the total payments for the two methods is
minimal (less than $400). With the discounting method a payment of
$55,355.56 could be received now and $40,000 at death. The total payment would be $95,355.56. The lien method offers $59,800 now and
$35,200 at death, a total of $95,000. The final deciding factors depend
upon the options available from the individual's insurance company.
Some companies only offer one of the options. The policyowner also
must decide if he or she would benefit from more money at acceleration
or at death. These decisions vary for each individual.

2.2

Regulations and Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Proceeds

When an accelerated death benefit is paid to a policyowner, the insurance company must send a statement illustrating the effect of the
benefit on the face amount of the policy, the specified amount of the
benefit, the accumulation account, the cash value, any loan balance, and
what the future premiums (if any) will be (Adam, 1990).
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) formulated model insurance regulations to serve as a guide to accelerated
death benefits. A disclosure required by the NAIC guideline l is a brief
description of the benefit and definitions of the conditions or occurrences that triggered the benefit payment. No further conditions may
be placed on the payment of accelerated benefits other than those specified initially in the policy or rider.
Benefit payment options also are covered in the NAIC 1996 guideline. The insured has the option of receiving the accelerated benefit
in a lump sum, in periodic payments for a fixed time, or in a fixed
amount for an indefinite period of time. Some companies require that
the accelerated benefit be taken as a lump sum, but most accommodate policyholder wishes. To receive the accelerated death benefit, the
owner often is required by the insurance company to surrender all or
part of his or her policyholder rights (Cruise, 1994).
1 NAIC guidelines can be obtained by writing to the NAIC at: NAIC, 120 West 12th
Street, Suite 1100, Kansas City MO 64105-1925, USA.
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The introduction of accelerated death benefits in early 1990 resulted
in the general public and some insurance companies being concerned
about tax uncertainties and terminology. To alleviate these concerns,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the NAIC established tax regulations and model insurance regulations, respectively. On August 21,
1996, President Clinton signed The Health Coverage Availability and
Affordability Act of 1996 (HR 3101) clarifying the tax treatment of accelerated death benefits. This act went into effect on January 1, 1997;
(see Chodes, 1997). The sections of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
that affect accelerated death benefits are Sections 72, 101, 7702, and
7702A. The regulations are being amended; more changes may occur
in the future.
State-specific regulations are based upon model regulations enacted
by the NAIC. The NAIC cannot force states or insurance companies to
use model regulations. Because the NAIC is composed of each state's
respective insurance commissioner, though, most states have adopted
the regulations.
Once the states accept regulations, insurance companies must comply and alter their poliCies (if needed) in order to do business within
each individual state. At first most states allowed accelerated death
benefit recipients to be exempt from state income taxes, though recipients may still have had to pay federal taxes (Blake, 1993). Because nobody really knew if taxes were owed or not, the NAIC advised insurance
companies to add a disclaimer suggesting the policyholder consult his
or her tax advisor about the tax treatment of such a provision (Adam,
1990).
Under Section 7702 of the IRC, a life insurance contract is defined as
any contract that is a life insurance contract under applicable law, but
only if the contract meets the cash value accumulation test or meets the
guideline premium requirement and falls within the cash value corridor.
Whichever of these two tests a life insurance contract meets at inception also must be met after a change in the death benefit is recorded
(Kraus, 1993). Therefore, a redetermination of values must occur after
accelera tion.
The tax treatment has always been a concern for those terminally
ill and considering such benefits. Current regulations provide that accelerated benefits will be considered as death benefits under Sections
101(a) and 7702. Section 101 states that any amount of a death benefit
received in a lump sum or otherwise paid by reason of death of the
insured is not included in a person's gross income (Freeman and Marcus, 1993). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 redefined Section 101 (g). With its passage there are now two types
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of accelerated death benefits (received after December 31, 1996) that
are excludable from gross income. They are amounts received from
a life insurance policy or from a viatical settlement company for the
sale or assignment of a policy. The determining factor is that the insured is terminally or chronically ill (Wolosky, 1996). The act defines
being terminally ill as having 24 months or less to live. To be classed
as chronically ill, the insured is not able to perform at least two of six
listed daily activities (Christopher, 1997). This paper, however, will not
cover chronic illness benefits in any depth.
The definitions and regulations of the IRS and NAIC aim to clarify the treatment of accelerated benefits. Most state insurance departments have adopted similar regulations, so the alterations necessary
from state to state tend to be minimal. It is most probable that the tax
laws and regulations will continue to change as the insurance industry
becomes more experienced in accelerated benefits. For now, the proceeds from a qualifying acceleration can be received free from personal
income tax. With this clarification, the insurance industry should notice more terminally ill persons submitting claims for accelerated death
benefits.

2.3 The Claims Process for Accelerated Death Benefits
The process for accelerating the payment of benefits on a life policy
has many elements. Most companies require a minimum face amount to
be carried on a policy, i.e., $100,000, before any claim for acceleration
of the death benefit can occur. Fraudulent claims can be reduced by
setting a limit to the amount of accelerated benefit a policyholder can
receive. A minimum amount also may be set to avoid the relatively
excessive administrative expenses in processing small claims.
Specialized claim forms are required for acceleration. These forms
must be comprehensive enough to encompass all aspects of the illness
and the benefit payout. In addition, these forms should include verification and certification from the insured's physician stating the date of
diagnosis of the terminal illness, the extent of the insured's symptoms,
the proposed treatments and their efficacy, and the expected life span
of the insured. The insured also should be asked to complete a claim
form to prevent fraud (Adam, 1990).
When claims are made during the contestable period, special effort
must be made to determine whether the illness was present at the inception of the policy (Hitzeman, 1992). If the illness was present, it
gives the insurance company a legal reason not to accelerate the death
benefit. The insurer must verify that the policy is a valid contract and
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was issued based upon correct and accurate information before it determines whether the accelerated benefit is payable.
The medical information required by the claim forms should provide
adequate data for an initial investigation for the possible contestability
of the payment. If the submitted information appears to be legitimate
and satisfactory to the insurance company's medical board, the claim
is processed and paid (Reimers, 1994).
If the information appears to be false, an extensive investigation
usually follows. Certain steps are recommended to protect insurance
companies from fraud by policyholders and physicians. First, companies must verify the attending physician's credentials. The next step is
to obtain treatment records from any attending physicians and hospitals. It also may be beneficial to interview the insured and/or spouse to
determine the extent and severity of the illness and to rule out the possibility of self-inflicted injuries as the cause of the terminal condition.
The policyholder must be asked if he or she is mentally competent and
be determined as such (Hitzeman, 1992). Anything that seems suspicious should be investigated to safeguard the insurance company.
The insurance company should reserve its right to reaffirm the diagnosis of terminal illness by the company's medical doctor. Most companies also state within their rider or policy that if the insured's physician
disagrees with the company's physician on the diagnosis, the company
will pay a third impartial physician to perform an evaluation. Both
parties should agree the third diagnOSis will be the one by which the
insured and the company will abide (Hitzeman, 1992).
Because claims only can be made by the policyowner, irrevocable
beneficiaries and assignees can complicate the claim process. If a release cannot be obtained from either of these two, payment of the advanced benefit should be refused (Adam, 1990). In most cases the beneficiaries are close to the insured and are aware of the ramifications of
acceleration. Irrevocable beneficiaries and assignees commonly playa
large role in the decision to accelerate.
Companies offering such riders must be fair to all parties so they are
not accused of taking advantage of the insured and the terminal condition. At the same time the company must make correct assumptions
about the premiums and/or fees charged so that they do not lose money
offering such a benefit. Discrimination must not exist in the underwriting and processing of different types of terminal illnesses (Adam, 1990).
The insurance company also must protect the privacy of the insured.
No matter how careful and methodical an insurance company is in
investigating claims, problems will arise. One problem is how to deal
with an insured who recovers after receiving the accelerated death ben-

112

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 5, No.1, 1997

efit. A correctly written policy should protect both parties in such an
event (Adam, 1990). Some companies require an insured to resume
payment of premiums on the face amount remaining after acceleration
if the insured survives beyond the acceleration period (Aerts, 1994).
Other companies waive the premium.
Another possible problem is an insured who commits suicide after
receiving his or her accelerated death benefit. If the suicide occurs
within the customary two year contestability period the policy would be
terminated; beneficiaries may have to repay the advance (Adam, 1990).
If suicide occurs after the contestable period beneficiaries may receive
the remaining death benefit. Each company must decide its stand on
suicides.
Claims practices of insurance companies are complicated by accelerated death benefits. In the past an insured died and a benefit was
paid. Now an insured may have a terminal illness, and a partial benefit may be paid. Insurance companies should expect more claims in a
wider variety and greater volume due to terminal conditions.
Accelerated death benefits are consumer friendly and possess a humanitarian appeal that complements traditional life insurance (Wang,
1990). This benefit promises an extra measure of financial security in
the event of a catastrophic or terminal illness. Life insurance products
have come to offer more while persons are alive instead of after they
have died. Accelerated death benefits are one way companies are offering their policyholders additional safeguards and personal benefits.
This benefit allows companies a slight marketing advantage. Accelerated benefits give the company's agents a selling point that is visible
and desirable for insureds. It is seen by some agents to be a low risk,
but a low reward provision.
Although some controversy surrounds accelerated death benefits,
most persons familiar with the concept praise it. The benefit may be received as a lump sum, in installments, or as expenses are incurred. Payment depends upon the insurance company and its established practices. The payment can be a way for a dying person to take care of
medical bills, visit family in a different part of the world, or do what
he or she always has dreamed. The adverse impact of an accelerated
death benefit is the decrease in the death benefit of the policy to the
insured's survivors.
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3 Viatical Companies
3.1

Viatical Settlements

There is a second option available to an insured whose insurance
company does not offer accelerated death benefits or to an insured who
wants an advance payment sooner than the insurance company offers.
This option is to sell the life insurance policy to a viatical company.
A viatical settlement is a private transaction in which a policyowner
sells the policy while the insured is living. The owner sells the policy
to a viatical company for an amount less than the face value of the
policy. Viaticals usually offer a contract under which the company is
designated as the sole benefiCiary of the life insurance policy. Most of
these contracts are made with insureds who are terminally ill or have a
catastrophic illness. Via tical companies expect to make their profits by
buying life insurance policies from terminally ill insureds.
The factors that determine the purchase price (Le., the amount of
payment offered) are based on the amount of the policy's death benefit,
the terminally ill insured's life expectancy, the annual premium, the
type of policy, the rating of the insurance company, and the market
rate available on a similar investment. Some companies may buy partial
benefits in which the policyholder names a co-benefiCiary who retains
an interest in the death benefit.
The purchase price, however, hinges on life expectancy-the more
time a person has to live, the less money the policyowner will receive
(Kristof, 1991). The key is evaluating an insured's life expectancy (Barrett, 1992). The sooner the insured dies, the sooner the viatical company receives the death benefit and its profit. This may sound inhumane [some have called viatical settlements death futures (Niedzielski,
1995)], but those selling the poliCies see the viatical option as a chance
to do something with part of the death benefit (Sing, 1990).
The policy sale process starts when the viatical company verifies
the life expectancy of the insured and computes a purchase price. The
owner can accept or reject the offer. If the policyowner rejects the
viatical company's initial purchase price, the viatical company often
returns to its investors and tries to improve its offer to one that is
more acceptable to the policyowner. Viatical companies are third-party
competitors in the free market. They try to offer the best possible price
to policyowners (Faig, 1997).
After buying the policy, the viatical company assumes the premium
payment and either becomes the sole beneficiary or a co-beneficiary of
the policy. At the time of death of the insured the viatical company
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collects the portion of the death benefit to which it is entitled. Thus
via tical companies require a large amount of upfront capital and have
no immediate payoff.

3.2

Regulations and Tax Treatment of Viatical Settlement
Proceeds

The via tical industry began in 1989 with three companies. Currently
there are 54 viatical settlement companies operating nationwide (Connolly, 1995b). The entire viatical industry is estimated to have had a
market of $400 million in policies purchased in 1994 and $500 million
in 1995, with the potential to reach $6 billion within the next five years
(Connolly, 1995a). As an industry they have established themselves as
an organized secondary market in the life insurance arena (Faig, 1997).
A growing concern is whether state insurance departments should
regulate viatical companies. Although viaticals are not insurance companies, they cross into the realm of the insurance industry. They are
purchasing policies involving mortality risk. A viatical company has the
option and ability to pay persons who have up to five years to live (which
is the void in the insurance industry that viatical companies fill) (Stone,
1993). Only settlements based on two years or less life expectancy,
however, could be received tax free.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 now
defines terminally ill as having 24 months or less to live. A stipulation in
the 1996 act is that in order for a viatical settlement to be considered
to be tax-free, the viatical company must be licensed by the state. If
that state does not have a licensing system the viatical must pay to the
policyowner at least the minimum in purchase price (see Table 1) for
policies as set by the NAIC viatical model act. The regulations do allow
viaticals to decide the length of life expectancy in which they will invest
and if they will pay more than these minimum required prices.
The percentages in Table 1 may be reduced 5 percent for viaticating
a policy written by an insurer rated less than the highest four categories by A.M. Best. This percentage reduction could be alleviated by
the existence of state guarantee associations which would lessen the
bankruptcy risk of the less favorably rated companies.
Though the number of persons wanting to sell their life insurance
policies to viaticals is relatively low, it continues to rise each year. Limits
to acceleration and the possibility for a high return mean that investors
are eager to buy viator policies. Insurance regulators and insurance
companies are concerned, however, that viatical companies may become a problem for the insurance industry. Moral risk has been cited
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Table 1
NAIC Model Minimum Pur cha se Pric
e
As a Per cen tag e of Policy Face Val
ue
Life Expectancy Months
Minimum
(In Months)
Percentage
<6

6-12
12- 18
18- 24
24+

80%
70%

65%
60%

50%

as a major factor in the regulation
of via tical companies. It has bee n
considered by som e tha t the via tica
l ind ustr y has bee n cre ated by com
panies waiting for a financial rew
ard tha t is greatly inc rea sed by the
early dea th of an insu red (Faig, 199
7).
Via tical companies ten d to believe
they are dealing with the sale of
a private ass et tha t sho uld not con
cern the NAIC. The viatical ind ust ry
also was und er atta ck by the Securit
ies and Exchange Commission (SEC
)
from August 1995 unt il July 1996.
The SEC con side red viatical settlemen ts to be securities and challen
ged their validity in the U.S. cou rt
sys tem (Connolly, 1995a). The SEC
wanted viaticals to reg iste r the frac
tionalized shares of life insurance poli
ces they were selling to investors.
Many of the via tical sett lem ent com
panies disliked this bec aus e it infringed on the small investors who
could only afford to pur cha se sha res
of policies and not entire ones.
The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals rule d in July 1996 tha t
viatical sett lem ent s are not securit
ies and are not to be con side red insur anc e policies either (Connolly,
1996). The cou rt held tha t "... a viatical sett lem ent is not an insurance
policy, and the bus ine ss of selling
fractional inte rest s in insu ran ce poli
cies is no par t of the bus ine ss of
insurance" (Connolly, 1996). The cou
rt rea son ed tha t profits from suc h
viatical sett lem ent s do not come from
the efforts of a par ty oth er tha n
the investors themselves. The SEC
may appeal this ruling.
The via ticals see the legislation and
regulations as hin dra nce s to
their business. Regulation also may
affect the selling price of policies.
With increased costs due to registr
ation fees and expenses inc urre d
bec aus e of req uire d compliance, the
amo unt an insu red would receive
would decrease. In the end, legislat
ion and regulations could hur t the
per son s regulators are trying to help
.
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companies, viaticals, and the general public) will lead to more stability
in the accelerated benefits industry.
Medical advances will be a significant factor in the future of accelerated death benefits for many reasons. First, with further developments
and enhancements of DNA and genetic testing, the diagnosis of the possibility of being stricken with a terminal illness at some point of time in
the future will become more accurate. Second, the enhanced treatment
of and/or cures for current diseases will reduce the severity of terminal
illness. These two reasons may make the calculation of life expectancies more difficult, however, as has been the example of AIDS protease
inhibitors. These inhibitors have greatly increase the life expectancy
of some patients while they have not had much of an effect on others.
Even though these are beneficial advances, such new-found methods
may cause uncertainty among those calculating life expectancies.
Eventually, increased accuracy in calculating life expectancy and
more readily available advanced treatment methods will lead to more
exact accelerated death benefit payments. The final payout, however,
will be based on who calculates the life expectancy, what formula is
used, and who has made the final terminal diagnosis. When the final
payout is made because of decisions of a handful of persons, the result
can make or break a terminally ill insured and could be construed as
morally unjust. Using a simple equation may allow difficult decisions
to be minimized by simplistic assumptions for mortality and interest.
If the time between payout and death can be determined, the dollar
investment necessary to cover the difference between the accelerated
portion and the actual will be more accurately calculated. This is an
advantage to all parties and would reduce the risk and profit margins.
Not only can the insurance and viatical companies cover any losses
while also making a profit, but insureds also should receive the best
price for the policy.
The path of accelerated death benefits and viatical settlement companies will continue in the same direction, but the company field will
narrow. Only those viaticals that are strong in their investment portfolios and keep up to date with medical advances will remain in the
accelerated death benefit market. In the future viaticals also may buy
life insurance policies from healthy but old persons.
Steven Arenson, a vice president of Viaticus, Inc., painted a picture
of the current viatical market. In Employee Benefit Plan Review (1996)
Mr. Arenson was quoted as saying, "Only 2% of the terminally ill are
AIDS patients, but 95% of those early viatical settlements (mid-1980's)
involved AIDS victims. Last year (1995), 23% of our viatical settlements
involved cancer patients." This represents the shift in the viatical mar-
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ket from one almost entirely serving AIDS patients to expanding to
other illnesses.
Some of the unsettled issues are:
• Whether the use of the accelerated benefit proceeds can be restricted (Pear, 1992); What happens if the insured lives longer than
the stipulated length for the acceleration; and
• What effects the accelerated benefits will have on a person's eligibility for governmental assistance (Will it be considered an asset?)
(Employee Benefit Plan Review, 1990).

Additional questions arise from beneficiaries over estate tax and estate/inheritance tax treatment of the death benefit remaining after acceleration. Because of these and other issues, some insurance companies have been waiting to initiate and introduce accelerated benefits.
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The Right to Underwrite? An Actuarial Perspective
With a Difference
Thomas A. Moultrie* and R. Guy Thomas t

Abstract
For a long time underwriting has been a part of the actuarial canon. With
increasing frequency, however, challenges are being issued against the right
of insurance companies to underwrite applications for new bUSiness, arguing
that certain aspects of the practice are undesirably discriminatory.
We explore the role of the actuary in the underwriting process and the challenges that are being set for the profession (as opposed to the life insurance
industry) as a result of this role. As the distinction between the interests of the
actuarial profession and the interests of the life insurance companies has become increasingly blurred, we consider how the profession can maintain this
distinction and so retain its identity as a profession worthy of public trust and
respect.
Key words and phrases: merit goods, fairness, social legitimacy, risk classification, independence, professional status

1

Introduction

In recent years there have been several papers by actuaries commenting on the broad social debate about what the authors call the
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"right to underwrite" or the "freedom to underwrite."l [For example,
see Leigh (1996) in the U.K. and de Ravin and Rump (1996) in Australia.]
These authors see the role of actuaries as defending the insurance industry against criticism from other interest groups which Leigh (for
example) disparages as "the medics, the moralists, and those who are
genetically unfit" (Leigh, 1996, p. 19). In this paper we intend to address
some of the same issues as these authors, but from a more independent
perspective.
We do not mean to imply that life insurance companies should not
seek to influence public debate on underwriting practice to protect their
commercial interests. The response of life insurance companies as an
industry is theirs to make. Such response may include lobbying, public
relations, and sponsorship of research that the industry thinks likely
to support its case. In this regard, the life insurance industry is no different from any other business group pursuing its own agenda. The
issue with which we are concerned, however, is the role of the actuarial profession in the debate on underwriting practice and the need to
articulate a separate, professional, actuarial perspective on the matter.
In our view the right to underwrite is not an issue that should be
examined solely within our discipline or only from the perspectives
of the life insurance industry. It is necessary to look at the nature of
insurance and the role that it plays in SOCiety. The right to underwrite
can be examined accurately only within this broad context.
This paper examines the broad issues first to establish a framework
in which insurance practice can be located. We start by outlining the
special features of insurance business that may lead public policy makers to impose restrictions on underwriting practices. We then examine
alternative concepts of distributive justice and discuss criteria by which
a risk classification scheme may be judged. After noting the limitations
of the actuarial perspective on these issues, we conSider the proper role
of the actuarial profession in underwriting and the broader proper role
of the actuarial profession in society.
1An earlier group of authors, Cummins et aI., (1983), produced a study of risk classification in life insurance. Their study concentrated mainly on the economic, statistical,
and practical aspects risk claSSification, and, as such, may not be germane to our discussion.
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2 The Nature of Insurance
2.1

Special Features of the Insurance Industry

Insurance companies, like all businesses, operate in a social context.
Within this context, however, insurance (particularly insurance of life,
health, and disability risks) has a number of special features that distinguish it from other consumer services. Some of these features may
lead to a perceived need for special regulation of insurance.
First, the seller of insurance insists on selecting the customers to
whom it will sell and on setting different terms for different individual customers; this is not a familiar phenomenon in mass consumer
markets.
Second, the cost of providing the service is not known in advance on
an individual level. This leads to a fundamental tension in all insurance
programs between pooling on the one hand and actuarial rating on the
other. This tension between pooling and pricing means that insurance
has a dual nature. Insurance is like private savings accounts in its actuarial rating features, but it is like public assistance in that payouts are
made selectively to those who suffer loss.
Third, insurance is a collective, communal enterprise; it is redistributive in nature. It redirects resources toward those who suffer loss
and away from those who do not. This feature distinguishes insurance
both from personal savings for adverse contingencies and from other
consumer services. Insurance can be made more or less redistributive,
but it is fundamentally different from other products that do not involve pooling and subsequent redistribution according to need.
Fourth, insurance against certain contingencies may be an example
of a merit good (that is, a good that society conSiders should be available
in certain quantities to all, even to those who do not have the resources
to purchase it in a market transaction).
Fifth, insurance may be a social good (that is, the supply of such a
good generates positive externalities, so that society has an interest in
ensuring that the good is supplied as widely as possible). The notion of
a positive externality refers to the benefits arising from the supply of
the service that accrue to persons other than those to whom the service
is supplied. For example, the satisfaction and sense of well-being of the
present authors may be increased by the knowledge that we live in a
society in which insurance is made available to certain disadvantaged
groups. (In this example, the positive externality is relatively intangible
in nature, but this need not necessarily be the case.)
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Sixth, insurance is unusual because in addition to competing in the
usual ways for service industries-price, level of service, product differentiation, recruitment of employees and agents-the insurers also
compete in risk selection. An insurer that introduces a new underwriting procedure that facilitates the exclusion of higher risks from its
insurance pool gains a competitive advantage over other insurers. This
selection competition does not contribute to the aggregate welfare of
consumers as obviously as do other types of competition, e.g., competition to reduce expenses. It therefore can be argued that public policy
should be directed toward discouraging this bad competition and promoting the good type of competition, e.g. on expense costs and level
of service.

2.2

Insurance as a Merit Good

Certain types of insurance are merit goods that society considers
should be available in certain quantities to all irrespective of ability to
pay. The extent to which particular types of insurance are merit goods
depends on the availability of alternatives to the particular insurance in
meeting social needs. For example, in a jurisdiction such as the United
States where access to adequate medical care is largely dependent on
the purchase of private insurance, insurance disabilities may lead to
broader social disabilities. In other jurisdictions such as the United
Kingdom where a high standard of medical care is guaranteed by the
state, it is less clear that insurance disabilities lead to social disabilities.
In such a society insurance may not be a merit good; one mainstream
political party in the U.K. remains ambivalent about whether it wishes
to encourage or discourage private medical insurance.
Medical insurance is not the only form of insurance for which the
status of the coverage as a merit good is influenced by state benefits.
The existence and level of state-provided death benefit, disability cover,
old age pensions, and other welfare benefits also have implications for
the extent to which the state expects individuals to be able to find private insurance to meet various contingencies.
Another example where private sector insurance disabilities can create broader social disabilities is the provision of mortgage coverage or
home loan business. If lenders generally require such insurance, then
uninsurable members of society are effectively precluded from home
ownership and its associated benefits. Some governments have recognized the need to remedy this social disability. For example, in France
an agreement has been reached between the FFSA (Federation of French
Insurers) and the Ministries of Trade and Health to provide loan secu-
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rity policies to HIV-infected individuals to reduce and limit these social
disabilities.
The relevance of the above examples and the extent to which insurance can be viewed as a merit good differ from country to country.
The trend in recent years in many countries away from state protection
and toward private insurance, however, has tended to increase the extent to which insurance is viewed as a merit good. If private insurance
continues to play an increasing role in meeting social needs, it seems
likely that society's interest in the social legitimacy of risk classification
variables will continue to increase.
Insurance has a number of special features that give it the characteristics of a merit good. Increasingly, this characterization has called
into question the fairness and social legitimacy of insurance practices.
In insurance, however, the concepts of fairness and social legitimacy
are not straightforward.

3 Fairness and Social Legitimacy in Insurance
3.1

Notions of Fairness

Actuaries traditionally have argued that underwriting is justifiably
unequal. This defense assumes that all forms of cross-subsidization
are inherently wrong: "[I]t represents an unfair charge to one individual
or group to subsidize another individual or group" (Paddon, 1990, p.
1363).

Many non-actuarial commentators take the opposite stand. They
argue that, in reality, society may prefer equality to equity (or, more
accurately, society may prefer equality of outcome rather than equality
of assessment). Actuarial fairness may be seen as seeking to place the
costs of misfortune on the unfortunate, a notion of fairness that nonactuarial commentators may regard as rather eccentric (O'Neill, 1997).
How do we decide between these views? The choice between alternative views of fairness is essentially a question of social philosophy. It
is not an actuarial question, and actuarial science is of little assistance
in answering the question.
Probably the most influential concept of fairness over the last 25
years has been that proposed by the Canadian philosopher John Rawls
(1972). Rawls' seminal book runs mote than 600 pages and has spawned
an extensive literature; here we can do no more than sketch the central
concepts.
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There are two aspects to the Rawlsian notion of fairness: the principle of greatest equal freedom and the principle of difference. (There
is also a principle of equality of opportunity, but that does not pertain
to the issues that we consider here.) The first principle, the principle of
greatest equal freedom, says that each person or organization should
have the widest possible freedom, but only to the extent that is compatible with the possession of equal freedom by other persons. The
second principle, the principle of difference, says that inequalities may
be justified, provided that they make even the poorest members of a
society better off than they would otherwise have been. Rawls argues
that these principles will be acceptable to all if they place themselves
behind a veil of ignorance; that is, they assume that when chOOSing
the principles by which society should operate, they do not know what
position in society they occupy.
It is not obvious from the Rawlsian perspective that fairness in insurance must mean equal treatment for equal risks. Nor is it obvious that the life insurers' unfettered freedom to underwrite as advocated by Leigh (1996) is consistent with Rawlsianjustice. Such freedom
for insurance companies may have adverse effects on the freedom of
individuals-for example, if this freedom for insurers prevents individuals from obtaining adequate health care. In most societies the sick and
disabled include some of the poorest individuals. It is difficult to see
how their exclusion from insurance risk pools can make these individuals better off than they otherwise would have been. The freedom-tounderwrite principle may fail to satisfy either facet of Rawlsian justice.
The Rawlsian perspective is only one view of justice, albeit an influential one; there are a number of alternatives. Some views place a higher
emphasis on merit or reward consequent upon individual choice, and
could be employed in defense of underwriting variables that society
perceives are linked to individual choices (e.g., smoking status).
Other ethical theories may offer more support for the paradigm of
conventional risk classification-although these theories, unlike many
apologists for the insurance industry, generally do not claim to be concerned with fairness.
For example, the principle of utilitarianism-"the greatest good for
the greatest number" -can be seen as supporting the exclusion of a minority of persons from insurance pools. Any utilitarian calculus, however, requires weighting the benefit enjoyed by those able to purchase
insurance marginally more cheaply against the harm suffered by those
excluded from insurance. In jurisdictions where buying insurance is
the means for obtaining adequate health care or other merit goods, exclusion from insurance can cause great harm to the indiVidual. It is not
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obvious that great and fundamental harm to a few is outweighed by a
marginal price benefit for many.
It would be easier to defend current practice if the insurance industry took steps to ameliorate the worst harms caused by risk classification; for example, the industry could establish industry-wide pools to
cover otherwise uninsurable risks. This approach has been followed in
a number of countries, sometimes at the insistence of government and
sometimes on a voluntary basis.

3.2

Social Consent to Insurance Practices

Another feature of a merit good is that it is widely perceived as a
good thing. This is true of life insurance, and the industry's sales depend on this perception. But what happens if life insurance comes to be
seen as undeSirable because it is discriminatory? Experience in other
markets suggests that consumer perceptions on ethical issues can have
a major impact on business. For example, certain U.K. banks suffered
considerable loss of business in the 1980s because of consumer boycotts motivated by the banks' perceived continuing involvement in, and
impliCit support of, the apartheid regime in South Africa. Consumer activism also has had an increasing impact on environmental issues. For
example, in 1995 the Shell Oil Company was forced to abandon its plans
for sinking its Brent Spar oil rig at sea because of a consumer boycott in
several European countries, despite the SCientific evidence on the merits of deep sea disposal as opposed to other decommissioning options
(such as on-shore dismantling).
In both cases the companies initially disparaged criticism as the
work of pressure groups, rather as some underwriters today disparage criticism of their unfettered right to underwrite. Yet in both cases
the companies were eventually made to look foolish, being forced to reverse positions in which they had invested financial and political capital
because of an increasing flood of public comment.
While these examples do not necessarily imply that the insurance
industry will be forced to follow a similar course, they do represent
a warning of the possible consequences for any business that fails to
respond to changes in social opinion.

3.3

Social Legitimacy of Risk ClaSSification Variables

The fairness of insurance classification procedures is a question extending beyond actuarial science. It is not surprising that many non-
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actuarial authors have considered the question of what determines the
legitimacy of a risk classification variable.
For example, Abraham (1985, p. 442) argues that classification variables may be suspect for any of the following reasons.
• A particular characteristic may be used improperly in other fields
and is therefore objectionable on symbolic grounds. For example,
women often are discriminated against in an economic context,
and, therefore, gender is suspect as a classification variable. Insurers ideally would like to disassociate risk classification from
the use of the same variables to stigmatize particular groups, but
this can be difficult to achieve-particularly because insurers play
many roles (e.g., as employers) outside the context of an insurance
contract.
• There may not be enough data to justify the classification.
• Some variables may be used only to the disadvantage of certain
groups and never to their advantage. An example in insurance
is the underwriting of medically impaired lives for life insurance
without a corresponding allowance in annuity prices offered.
Wortham (1986, p. 417) proposes seven criteria for assessing rating
factors (with translation into statistical terminology where appropriate):
• Statistical power. The probability of accepting a life on terms that
would not be used if all relevant facts were known should be as
small as possible.
• Statistical size. The probability of rejecting a life that would be
accepted on the terms proposed if all relevant facts were known
should be as small as possible.
• Causality. Classification factors for which a causal explanation
can be given are preferred to factors for which the link is purely a
statistical correlation and there is no apparent causal explanation.
• Incentives to loss reduction. Classification factors that provide
incentives for the policyholder to reduce the risk of losses are
socially beneficial. For example, if cigarette smoking is viewed as
a matter of free choice rather than an addiction, then classification
by smoker or nonsmoker status provides such an incentive.
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• Controllability. This criterion is a pre-condition for the previous
criterion. A classification variable cannot provide an incentive to
loss reduction unless it is to some extent controlled by the insured.
• Compatibility with social values. This criterion relates to the use
or abuse of the classification variable in other contexts. If a variable is misused or has been misused to disadvantage particular
groups, the use of the variable in insurance may be tainted by association. This situation prevails in many countries with regard
to racial discrimination in insurance.
• Are alternatives to private insurance available? The existence of
such alternatives may result in insurance classifications being of
lesser concern for public policy.
Probably only the first two of these criteria (the statistical criteria)
normally would be considered in any actuarial analysis to determine
an appropriate rating structure. This does not mean that the actuarial
approach is wrong, but it does mean that it is incomplete.

3.4

Limitations of the Actuarial Perspective

To illustrate our view that the actuarial perspective on underwriting
is incomplete, it is instructive to review how actuaries have defined
underwriting.
One such definition of underwriting or risk classification is that it is
"the process of grouping risks with similar risk characteristics so as to
appropriately recognize differences in cost" (Paddon, 1990, p. 1362).
Implicit in this definition is a concept of how we should appropriately recognize differences in cost. What is appropriate depends on
the relative merits of equity and eqUality. The definition implies thatin the market for life insurance, at least-equity is a more desirable
outcome than eqUality. Unlike some other actuaries writing about underwriting, however, Paddon does acknowledge this choice: "As actuaries we do not oppose equality in and of itself. However the means
by which [equality] is increased can have unanticipated consequences,
and in some cases results quite opposite of those intended" (1990, p.
1365).
But actuaries are not the only persons who have access to determining what is fair and what is not. Lawyers, medical practitioners, underwriters, and policy makers all have their own different interpretations
about fairness in insurance.
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Another reason why the actuarial perspective on fairness in insurance is incomplete is that actuaries tend to consider fairness only from
the point of view of existing policyholders. But the issue of distributive
justice can be viewed (Stone, 1990, p. 393) from inside the circle of policyholders or from the vantage point of people who are already ill who
are not policyholders. From a societal perspective, the persons who
need life insurance most (Le., those who are already ill) are precisely
the individuals whom, from within the circle of policyholders, it is economically necessary and fair to exclude. This conflict between views of
fairness from alternative vantage points is the crux of disagreements
over fairness in insurance.

4 The Actuarial ProfeSSion's Role in Underwriting
Underwriting is not a scientific discipline; underwriters frequently
use intuition and experience in making decisions. In principle, the contribution made by actuaries in establishing the statistical justifications
for particular underwriting processes can be seen as scientific. In some
cases, however, the scientific basis of actuaries' underwriting recommendations is difficult to discern.
The demands of practical work necessitate the use of some approximations. But in South Africa, for example, there has been an alarming
trend for risk classification schemes dependent on factors that have
not been properly investigated. Truyens (1993, p. 9), referring to the
post-April 27, 1994 changes in South Africa, asked whether incomebased and education-based rate differentiation would be outlawed as
irrational discrimination. He feared that unless the South African insurance industry could produce actuarial statistics to justify such differentiation, that it would be deemed irrational discrimination. Many
antidiscrimination laws (for example, in New Zealand, the EU, and the
United States) make specific provision for waiver on the grounds of
actuarially justifiable statistics. But if actuaries term particular conclusions "actuarially justifiable" when they are based on suspect foundations as alluded to by Truyens, their credibility with public policy
makers will be eroded.
The credibility of the profeSSion also depends on our acknowledging legitimate non-actuarial concerns pertaining to underwriting procedures. The policy statements of other actuarial bodies recognize
some of the issues associated with the social acceptability of underwriting. For example, the Institute of Actuaries of Australia (1994) has
stated that where chosen risk classification factors have been found to
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be no longer significant or to be socially unacceptable, they have been
removed. They also acknowledge that actuaries need to review continually the factors that they choose in order to "reflect the effect of
emerging statistics and changing social attitudes."
But the actuarial profession needs to recognize that although actuaries establish the statistical justification for particular underwriting
processes, the decision to implement them is a commercial decision
taken by life offices in view of other social forces. This distinction between the role of the actuary as a professional and that of the industry is
crucial if national actuarial associations wish to be regarded as professions (as opposed to trade unions of life insurance company employees
or technicians).
Although our focus has been classification factors that society finds
unacceptable, societal preferences also can have the opposite effect.
For example, if insurers had chosen not to recognize smoking as an
underwriting variable, this position might have been difficult to sustain
in light of increasing public recognition (and disapproval) of the effects
of smoking on mortality.

5 The Actuarial Profession's Role in Society
The previous section concerns the role of the actuarial profession
in underwriting. In this section we broaden the discussion to consider
the proper role of the profession in society and the requirements that
actuaries must meet if society is to regard the actuarial profession as
one worthy of public trust and respect.
Two over-arching requirements for the ongoing social acceptance of
professions are those of independence and social benefiCiation.

5.1

Independence

It is necessary to distinguish the role of the actuary as a scientist
and professional and her (or his) role as a life insurance company employee. As a scientist and as a professional the actuary is constrained
by responsibilities more stringent than those that affe<;t life insurance
companies. Life insurance companies can be assumed to act in a way
that preserves their interests and position in society. If an association of individual actuaries aligns itself too closely with such vested
interests, however, the association risks compromising its professional
identity and integrity.
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One of the key roles of a profession is to be able to articulate both
sides of a debate-to observe the pros and cons of any given course of
action. According to Paddon (1990, p. 1365): "... we have a responsibility to encourage those who make public policy to understand the impact
of a proposal or decision." In recent years the actuarial profession has
not played this role well, at least not with respect to underwriting. The
contribution of actuaries generally has been to act as partisan defenders of the life insurance industry.
While actuaries may side with life insurers on particular issues, the
maintenance of professional status depends on actuaries being perceived as capable of distinguishing a professional viewpoint from the
commercial viewpoint of the life insurance industry.
In a number of countries actuaries' status as professionals is questionable because of actuaries' inability or unwillingness to maintain this
distinction. In South Africa, for example, the problem is exacerbated
by the fact that in recent years the profession has had no input in important social and legal processes, instead choosing to subsume its responses to those of the Life Offices' Association (LOA). In effect, the
message is that the views of the South African actuarial profession are
identical to those held by the LOA.
This apparent lack of independence is potentially damaging not only
to professional status, but also to the profession's prospects for expansion. If actuaries are seen as being uniquely identified with the life
insurance industry, in the longer term this perceived lack of independence can only hinder the growth and expansion of the profession.

5.2

Social Beneficiation

Independence is a necessary, but not suffiCient, condition for the
maintenance of professional status. A second requirement for the longterm surVival of a profession is that of social beneficiation. By this we
mean that the work that we do as professionals should add value to
SOciety.
Some actuaries would argue that performing traditional actuarial
roles in life insurance companies and pension funds is sufficient for this
purpose. If society decides to reevaluate the way in which the insurance
business operates, however, the actuarial profession may come under
scrutiny too. If actuaries are seen to be capable only of defending the
rights of the life insurance industry and its current policyholders, it is
possible that actuaries will be seen as life insurance technicians with
no other role than performing prescribed calculations and lobbying for
those institutions.
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An alternative is to view the social responsibility of the actuary as
extending beyond these institutions. Such an approach would not be
merely altruistic. By demonstrating its ability to look beyond the shortterm interests of its principal employers, the profession could increase
the possibility of expanding and developing its professional influence
into other areas.

6

Summary and Conclusion

Insurance underwriting, like all business practices, operates in a social context. Insurance has a number of distinguishing features that
give it some of the features of a merit good (that is, a good that society
considers should be available in certain quantities even to those who do
not have the resources to purchase it in a private market transaction)
and some of the features of a social good (that is, a good the supply of
which generates positive externalities).
The importance of these features depends on the extent to which
social needs are met by private insurance. If the insurance industry
wants an increasing social role for private insurance and the associated
opportunities for profit, it must accept that society will take a greater
interest in the social legitimacy of risk classification procedures. The
alternative is for the industry to decline this increased social role and
retreat into a more limited position in which its risk classification procedures will be of less concern to society.
Actuaries should recognize that the actuarial perspective on fairness in insurance claSSification has its limitations and that actuaries
are not the only arbiters of fairness. The acceptability of underwriting procedures is societally determined, and a profession that fails to
recognize and make allowances for this may find itself ostracized and
increasingly ignored.
It should be possible for actuaries to take a different position from
that of their principal employers in the debate on underwriting and in
other debates where corporate and professional views are not necessarily congruent. Unless actuaries are perceived as being capable of
holding a different view-whether they do so in practice or not-the
professional status of the actuarial profession could come under threat.
If actuaries are to survive as a profession-one that actively engages
in debate and the expansion of knowledge and that is aware of its responsibilities to society-actuaries must challenge themselves about
what it means to be an actuary, as opposed to an employee of a life
insurance company.
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Discussion of T.A. Moultrie and R.G. Thomas's
''The Right to Underwrite? An Actuarial Perspective
With a Difference"
Charles L. Trowbridge*
This interesting but controversial paper studies a subject I too have
seriously considered. Nearly a decade ago I was commissioned to prepare a monograph that appeared in 1989 under the auspices of the
Actuarial Education and Research Fund under the title Fundamental
Concepts of Actuarial Science. 1Chapter VII of this work, "Classification,
Selection, and Antiselection," claims that the cluster of ideas surrounding these three words form a fundamental actuarial concept.
I have recently reviewed this monograph (hereinafter FCAS) and am
struck by the dissimilarities between the two treatments. The authors
of "The Right to Underwrite?" (RTU) were unaware of my work, and I
mean this in no derogatory sense. FCAS does not appear in the usual
literature search, particularly one undertaken from overseas.
This discussion will be an outline of the points at which FCAS and
RTU differ. I will paraphrase, avoiding detail and concentrating on the
essentials. I highlight the important differences by considering only the
three questions stated below.

*Charles L. Trowbridge, F.S.A., was employed by Bankers life Company (now the Principal Mutual Life) immediately after receiving his M.A. degree in 1938 and has remained
with the company until his retirement in 1979. For thirty months in the early 1970's
he was chief actuary of Social Security Administration of the u.s. For four years in the
early 1980's he was professor of actuarial science at the University of Michigan.
Mr. Trowbridge has served on the Society of Actuaries (SOA) Board of Governors for
nine years, including a term as President (1975). He has written extensively for the
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries and for other actuarial, insurance, and business
publications, and has served as the editor of the SOA's publication The Actuary.
Mr. Trowbridge's address is: 8115A 58th Ave. SE, Olympia WA 98503, USA. Internet
address: trow@nwrain.com
ITrowbridge, c.L. Fundamental Concepts of Actuarial Science. Schaumburg, IlL: Society of Actuaries, 1989.
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Why Do Insurance Companies Underwrite?
Chapter VII of FCAS states that insurance companies underwrite not
because of any specific concept of fairness and not because they have a
right or freedom to do so, but because they must. If insurance prospects
have choices about whether to buy, in what amount, and from whom,
they can be expected to act in their perceived self interest and antiselect
against the collective. Underwriting has no other purpose than selfprotection. (To emphas~ze this point, FCAS notes that the predominant
forms of life insurance protection, at least in North America, are those
where such chOices are not given, where antis election is minimal, and
where und~rwriting disappears).
RTU, on the other hand, does not mention antiselection. RTU has
no clear answer to the question, though at one point RTU suggests that
the purpose of underwriting is the creation of a competitive advantage
for the insurer. I am troubled by the antiselection omission. Do the
authors of RTU believe that antis election does not exist or that it can
be disregarded?

What Is the Relationship Between Underwriting and the Actuarial Profession?
FCAS treats the cluster of ideas surrounding classification, selection, and antiselection as one of a handful of fundamental actuarial
concepts. Sound classification systems have a statistical component,
but FCAS recognizes that SOCially oriented considerations also can be
important. While actuaries have no monopoly in the design of classification systems, they do have expertise. This expertise may lie in
the ability to examine all aspects of a difficult problem. Classification
systems in use today are products of actuarial thinking tempered by
actuarial experience.
RTU, on the other hand, views the relationship differently. The actuarial approach is defined only statistically. After defining the term so
narrowly, however, RTU says that the actuarial approach is incomplete.

Do Life Company Actuaries Have a Professional Obligation to
Speak Out When They Disagree With the Company's Classification System?
RTU seems to answer this question with a resounding yes. The authors of RTU clearly and honestly speak and suggest that others should
do the same.
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FCAS is silent on this question. If forced, the author of FCAS might
reply as follows. The views of the insurance industry and of the actuarial profession on classification are similar. Both realize there are
no perfect solutions to this difficult matter, and both are searching for
better answers, especially in areas where statistical and social considerations conflict. If any person, actuary or otherwise, has constructive
ideas on how classification methods for any financial security system
can be improved, these ideas should be well received. These ideas,
however, must recognize the world as it is, not as we wish it were.

William R. Lane*
The authors raise a number of issues that are legitimate societal
concerns today. Several points, however, are worth noting.

Two Types of Insurance
The authors rightly determine that the distinction between insurance as a merit good and insurance as a social good is important. But
they do not differentiate forms of insurance.
Certain types of insurance are largely all-or-none propositions. A
person either has or doesn't have medical insurance. While a huge spectrum of provisions to medical insurance (such as deductibles, coinsurance, and restrictions applicable to managed care provider networks)
exists, a central question remains: Does the level of benefits available
to insureds allow them access to medical care services for all types of
injuries and illnesses? Under these circumstances, the issue of whether
insurance is a merit good becomes a critical question. If society deems
access to medical care services to be a merit good (in other words, available without regard to ability to pay), then medical insurance also must
be considered as a merit good. It is important to note that the cost of

*William R. Lane, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., is prinCipal for Heartland Actuarial Consulting, LLe.
He spent eleven years with Mutual of Omaha in various positions starting as a second
vice president and ending as a senior vice president. From 1986 to 1993, he was Mutual
of Omaha's group actuary responsible for a block of medical insurance of over a billion
dollars in premium. He has been Group Actuary for several other companies including
Guarantee Life, Protective Life, and Time Insurance.
Mr. Lane is vice chairman of the Health Benefits Research Committee for the Society
of Actuaries (SOA) and has chaired the SOA's Task Force on Risk Adjustors. He actively
participated in the lobbying efforts when health care reform was being discussed in the
U.S. Congress.
Mr. Lane's address is: Heartland Actuarial Consulting, LLC, 2615 South 159 Plaza,
Omaha NE 68130, USA. Internet address: WmRLane@aol.com
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medical insurance with a $100,000 maximum benefit and the cost of
medical insurance with a $10 million maximum benefit is not significantly different. The preponderance of the cost of medical insurance is
determined by the benefits that most persons consider to be basic to the
insurance (such as covering most of the cost of hospital and physician
services).
Other types of insurance are incremental. For example, a person
may have $10,000 of life insurance, or $25,000 of insurance, or $10
million of life insurance. While it may be argued that a minimum level
of life insurance is a merit good (at least as long as the individual has
dependents who rely on the individual for income), it would be difficult
to argue the same point for $10 million of insurance. In this case the
cost for $10 million of insurance is essentially 1,000 times the cost
of a $10,000 policy. Thus, for life insurance, if one is to argue that
it constitutes a merit good, then one also must determine how much
coverage is required as a social necessity.
The two concepts, all-or-none and incremental, are not mutually exclusive. For example, disability income replacement is largely an all-ornone proposition with regard to the types of disabilities covered, but
the benefit amount is incremental. Life insurance, if offered, rarely excludes specific conditions after the contestable period. Thus, the issue
of what causes of death are covered is usually not significant. Given
the trend to ever increasing deductibles for medical insurance, it also
has an element of incremental benefit levels.
Incremental benefits can be considered a merit good only to the
extent that the level of benefits is appropriate. Hence, the debate for
such benefits must begin with a question of what level of benefit is
under discussion. All-or-none benefits, however, beg the issue of their
social necessity; the question of whether the coverage constitutes a
merit good is critical. Hence, any discussion of whether society should
require insurance products to be available should begin by limiting the
discussion to those products that are merit goods, and that will require
for some forms of insurance a discussion of how much coverage is a
social requirement and how much is a personal decision.

An Actuarial Issue
The authors claim that "the choice between alternative views of fairness ... is not an actuarial question." I strongly disagree. Offering
a good as a merit good requires redistribution of revenue. When the
good is purchased on a voluntary basis, knowledgeable persons resist
the purchase to the extent they perceive the price of the good has been
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increased by such redistribution to the point that the value of the good
to the individual is no longer worth the cost. All forms of insurance
require redistribution. That is the chief purpose of insurance. But individuals, when viewing such a voluntary transaction, make a personal
determination if the cost of redistribution is worth the value of the
benefit obtained by the insurance.
The question then arises: At what point does offering insurance on a
voluntary basis become financially impossible (in other words, the product is incapable of statistically providing a profit that at least equals the
cost of capital) when legislation or social expectations have required the
insurer to consider the product as a merit good?
While the understanding and financial modeling of individual selection of insurance is not an exact science, it is within the province of
the actuary. No other profession is as well equipped to understand
and evaluate these financial mechanics as the actuary. This issue has
been explored in the context of various insurance coverages within the
United States. It is professionally challenging, but cannot be considered
as strictly a question of social philosophy.
For many years medical insurance in the United States was relatively
inexpensive and was offered by many Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations as essentially a merit good. Individuals and employers were
largely not underwritten, and prices were rarely, if ever, related to the
individual risk. As the cost of medical coverage rose, however, the willingness of individuals and employers to finanCially support this redistribution of revenue declined. Providers of medical insurance, including Blue Cross and Blue Shield, were faced with the issue of accepting
prospects for coverage and basing the price of coverage on the expected
cost of coverage or going out of business due to bankruptcy.
This change in underwriting culminated in a national debate over
health care reform. At the crux of that debate was the issue of whether
medical insurance was a merit good. (Albeit the term was rarely if ever
used by the popular press.) I participated in this debate in several ways.
In the United States actuaries vigorously discussed all sides of the question. Those actuaries who strongly favored considering medical insurance as a merit good were forced to bring actuaries into the debate
because a merit good loses it value if it can't be finanCially supported.
In other words, the actuarial question of how to financially support a
voluntarily purchased merit good had to be answered; public policy resisted legislation that restricted the insurance providers in their ability
to underwrite and differentiate in price based on risk.
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Simply because society wishes for something to be available at a
given price doesn't make it possible. A law requiring luxury cars to
be sold for $100 each would not make them more available. It simply would mean that no luxury cars would be sold to anyone. Though
insurance is more complex than a luxury car, the result of outlawing underwriting would produce the same result: no insurance, as we know it
today, would be sold.
Actuaries have an important role in helping the general public understand the ramifications that such decisions produce. Actuaries also
have a critical role in the financial modeling of such restrictions and the
development of alternate approaches that balance the financial needs
of the insurers with society's desire to make insurance available to alL
It has been my experience in this country that many actuaries have contributed to this debate and have reflected all sides of the questions at
hand.

Authors' Reply to Discussion
We thank the discussants for their comments and suggestions. We
are grateful to Mr. Trowbridge for drawing our attention to his monograph, which contains a broader treatment than is typical in actuarial
accounts of underwriting.
Mr. Trowbridge asked if we believed that anti-selection does not exist. That anti-selection can and does occur in voluntary insurance is
not in dispute. The extent to which it occurs, and whether its occurrence Significantly impairS the viability of private insurance, however,
are strictly empirical questions for which the answers will differ according to the class of insurance, the rating factors concerned, and over
time. For many classes of insurance, some degree of anti-selection may
be regarded as socially optimal according to Rawlsian or other public
choice criteria. More prosaically, the occurrence of some degree of antiselection may maximize public acceptance of the insurance mechanism
(as noted by Mr. Lane in the context of medical insurance).
In the light of our brief excursions into social philosophy, both discussants were concerned to reclaim risk classification as a largely if not
exclusively actuarial matter. According to Mr. Trowbridge, actuaries'
expertise may lie in their ability to examine all aspects of a difficult
problem. Actuaries have a statistical and financial training, but they
typically have little knowledge of social philosophy or ethics and no
professional interest in, or concern for, persons who are harmed by
underwriting practice. Even if actuaries might be capable of examining
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all aspects of the problem, there are other constraints that make them
reluctant to do so; as Mr. Trowbridge notes, the views of actuaries on
underwriting are usually conveniently aligned to those of their principal
employers.
Finally, we were exhorted to recognize the world as it is, not as we
wish it were. The world as it is to whom? To actuaries ensconced comfortably in the insurance industry, or to those whom actuaries would
exclude from medical insurance in the name of the principle of actuarial fairness? The acceptability of the world as it is depends on from
where it is viewed.

